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ARTICLES
Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction

and the New Reproductive Technologies
Janet L. Dolgin

INTRODUCTION

To human conduct, the fabricated image of how things were-the myth of
history, not history itself-is often crucial, because that image reflects what
people desire and is therefore the standard by which conduct is fashioned.
As people, however, desire many things, all too often, contradictory things,
the image-the myth-must be studied with care, with a cautious regard for
ambiguity and confusion.
In American culture, the myth of the family and, within that, the myth of
the child, reflect what Americans want their families and their children to be.
As, however, Americans want both family and children to be many thingsall too often, contradictory things-they manipulate, often to their own
confusion, and in complex ways, the myths that they have constructed.
Nostalgic images of children have shaped and justified the law's
understanding and regulation of family matters since the nineteenth century.
By the middle of the twentieth century, such images had become
indispensable to the ideology' of the American family, and therefore perhaps
*
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1.
By "ideology" this Article does not mean a set of false beliefs, but rather the system of
underlying, pervasive, and often unarticulated beliefs, in terms of which people think about
themselves and their world. This meaning of ideology follows that of the French anthropologist and
Indologist Louis Dumont. Dumont wrote:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction
of matter but one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left
out when everything true, rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take
everything that is socially thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that
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the most fundamental, and apparently unassailable, tenet of American family
law had become the best interests of children.
The law's apparent concern for children developed as vast changes in the
scope and meaning of family were effectuated during the early years of the
Industrial Revolution. Focusing on children as the essential, and most
valued, component of family life served family law well. During a century
of great transformation, the law, consistently presuming to serve the interests
of children (and thus of decency), was able to accommodate startling changes
under the rubric of one essential concern: the welfare of children in
families.
The law's real concern with children in the past century and a half,
however, has also proved a pretext, a mask for other concerns. Not only
have children often been badly served by rules centered around the
children's interests, but these rules have consistently concealed other
interests, including the diverse interests of adult society in both preserving
and transforming patterns of traditional family life. Associating these other
interests with images of children and childhood has protected the underlying
interests by suggesting that, in the association, their proponents also support,
or at least acknowledge, a moral order. Children have not been well served
by the same association. As children's interests are proclaimed-even
apparently investigated and analyzed in detail-in case after case, they are
subsumed by larger agendas, often unacknowledged-and almost as often,
unrecognized.
At the same time that the best-interest standard developed in law as the
operating principle through which to resolve disputes involving children,
families became
increasingly individualistic.
Additionally, society
increasingly has adopted a rule of choice that provides for no-fault divorce,
the enforcement of pre-marital contracts, and the legal recognition of nonmarried cohabitants. Nostalgic images of children, recalling a valued, if
highly romanticized past, eased the law's response to disputes reflecting
these changes. Troublesome and unsettling implications of viewing family
life as founded on contingent connections between individuals who choose to
bond were mitigated and displaced by emphasizing the law's central concern:
children. Clearly, lawmakers therein suggested, a legal system dedicated to
the welfare of children protected the very best aspects of traditional family
life, even while the legal system participated in the transformation of that
life.
it is a living whole, the interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts
would be blocked out by the a priori introduction of our current dichotomies.
Louis DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX 22 (1977).
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By the end of the twentieth century, changes in the family and in our
understanding of the family that have evolved since the start of the Industrial
Revolution2 exploded with new force. The law recognized these changes
expressly by defining "family" as a collection of individuals, joined through
their choice to associate in familial form. 3 And the law implicitly
acknowledged these changes through pervasive legislative enactments and
judicial decisions that provided for, and regulated, new choices in the
creation and operation of family life. 4 By the late 1970s, these remarkable
changes were joined by those incident to the development of reproductive
technology.
Reproductive technology brought a new order of challenge that
questioned the biological, as well as the social, correlates of family
relationships and thus magnified the earlier disruptions of changing familiar
assumptions about family.
With the advent of the new reproductive
technologies, the processes of change accelerated at a rate almost, if not
actually, beyond society's capacity to adapt.
In attempting to accommodate changes in the meaning and form of family
engendered by the new reproductive technologies, 5 society has turned to the
law. 6 Compelled to respond to difficult real-life disputes arising as a result
of these new technologies, courts flounder in confusion. They continue to
invoke and rely on images of children, but less often and less successfully
than in earlier cases. Moreover, in such cases, judicial invocations of the
child's interests mask other concerns more now than ever before. Thus,
courts refer to children's (and embryos') interests to justify decisions that
2.
These nineteenth and early twentieth century changes clearly had their roots in earlier
times. The broad historic changes that resulted in the demise of feudalism and permitted the
development of the Industrial Revolution also affected understandings of family life. Moreover, the
family that developed with the Industrial Revolution found its specific intellectual roots in the
Enlightenment. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L. J. 1519 (1994).
3.
See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's
recognition of family as collectivities of autonomous individuals).
4.
See generally Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443
(describing changes in family law system in past several decades).
5.
The term "new reproductive technologies" describes forms of assisted reproduction made
accessible since the late 1970s, including in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, gamete and embryo
cryopreservation, and in the last several years, intracytoplasmic sperm injection.
These
technologies are described infra part IV. In general, artificial insemination, available for hundreds
of years, is not classified as a new reproductive technology.
This Article uses the terms
"reproductive technology" and "assisted reproduction" interchangeably.
6.
The call of judges for legislative action is found again and again in opinions resolving
disputes occasioned by reproductive technology. But legislatures have been slow to react and
regulate the new reproductive technologies. Moreover, the speed of technology change is so rapid
that legislative responses almost invariably become incomplete within short periods of time.
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validate and invalidate surrogacy contracts; 7 to establish the ontological
status of frozen embryos as people, or as something special but not quite
human;8 and to confirm the biological essence of the parent-child bond and
demonstrate its motivational and intentional essence.9
In these cases, children represent tradition as well as modernity. They
are used to demonstrate the moral inexorability of biological truth as well as
the advantageous consequences of challenging that truth.
And they
symbolize the victory of culture over nature as well as that of nature over
culture. In short, children "say" too much. In consequence, images of
children are now less useful to courts in accommodating change.
In
addition, the real interests of children often evaporate completely, almost
visibly, as the law attempts to render sensible, regulatory changes that upset
society's most fundamental expectations and assumptions about the meaning
of familial relationships.
Section I of this Article discusses a historical process, dating from the late
medieval period, which necessitated the creation of the American myths of
family and children. Section II explains why the myths were created when
they were, and describes them. Section III shows how, for the past century
and a half, American culture, as reflected in American law, has invoked the
myths in support of contradictory social impulses. This contradiction is
illustrated by examining the creation and application of the family law
principle that asks courts that resolve disputes involving children to effect the
best interests of those children. Sections IV and V show how society and
law, over the past two decades, have invoked, transformed, and sometimes
even ignored, familiar myths about family and children in confronting a
sudden and startling revolution in human reproduction.
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FAMILY

Once deeply embedded in a world that valued hierarchy and determined
worth as an inevitable correlate of social position, the family survived the
destruction of the feudal order and emerged in the modern world as a lonely
vestige of a social order that valued hierarchy and holism. As such, the
family has become a symbol, as well perhaps, a historic repository, for a
world that contrasts with the marketplace. In this sense, the family in the
modern world represents an older universe in which social relations were

7.
8.
9.

See infra part V.B.
See infra part V.A.
See infra part V.C.
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hierarchical and holistic and reflected equality and individuality only
fleetingly and incidentally.
For much of the past two centuries, the family was understood as a
unique domain of interaction that contrasted with interactions in the
marketplace. Society and law understood the family as a universe of private
interactions grounded in natural and supernatural truths. On those truths
were predicated the hierarchical structure of the family unit as well as the
enduring inevitability of family relationships. The family was almost unique
within society. However, other, older societies have functioned, and far
more broadly, with hierarchy and holism as governing principles-not
distinctively in the restricted domain of family life, but in almost all domains
of life.' 0 The feudal world was, and assumed that society should be, a
hierarchical whole, anchored in religious and natural truth.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the English anthropologist Sir Henry
Maine contrasted his own world with that of an earlier time in which birthdetermined status organized social relations, and in which bargained
negotiations between putatively equal contract partners, defined through the
notion of autonomous individuality, governed almost no aspects of social
interaction. 11 Maine wrote:
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one
respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the
gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of
individual obligation in its place. The individual is steadily
substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take
account ....
Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man
and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in
rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It is
contract. Starting as from one terminus of history, from a
condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are
summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily
moved toward a phase of social order in which all these relations
arise from the free agreement of individuals. 12
In a world such as our own in which the predicates of contract
predominate, the individual is the smallest unit of social value. Maine
10.
See generally LOUIS DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHICUS (1970).
11.
As Louis Dumont has persuasively argued, many, if not all, societies find some place for
social forms that seem, in general, to contract the society's predominant patterns of understanding
human interaction. DUMONT, supra note 10, at 231-38.
Dunont provided the example of
renouncer sects in traditional caste India. These sects depend on notions of individualism almost
entirely foreign to the larger society. DUMONT, supra note 10.
12.
HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 99 (J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1917) (1861).
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suggests an earlier world in which the smallest unit of value was the
hierarchically organized whole. Within that holistic society, rights and
duties flowed inevitably from one's position in the larger hierarchy. Maine
describes this as a world of status and contrasts it with a world of contract.
He wrote:
All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were
derived from, and to some extent are still colored by, the power
and privileges anciently residing in the Family. If then we employ
Status . . . to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid
applying the term to such conditions as are the immediate or
remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.13
In a world of status, as Maine described it, rights and duties are fixed at
birth and are understood as unchanging because they are connected to
relations understood as natural. So, for example, the relations between a
master and serf or between a pater familias and the members of his
household follow set forms that are assumed by the very fact of the
relationship. In such a world, position cannot be negotiated but follows from
the very nature of things. Moreover, in a world reflecting a hierarchical,
holistic view of reality, laws are not formulated for application to the
abstract, and putatively equal, individual. Rather, laws flow from the
perceived order of things.14 The rules of human discourse follow inevitably
from the essential nature of the relationship.
The anthropologists Louis Dumont 15 and Steven A. Barnett 16 characterize
the ideology of traditional caste India in terms similar to those that Maine
associates with a world of status. The analyses of Dumont and Barnett
illuminate the differences between a world (such as our own) that values
equality and autonomy and a world (such as feudal Europe or caste India)
that values hierarchy and holism. Barnett and Dumont argue that in caste
India, inequalities reflected the dominant sstem of belief-the way people
thought their world was and should be.
Comparatively, in the West,
inequalities such as racism and patriarchy conflict with an egalitarian
ideology and are thus constantly being explained away (often the response to

13.
14.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 98-99.

See generally DUMONT, supra note 10.
Steven A. Barnett, Identity Choice and Caste Ideology in Contemporary South India, in
THE NEW WIND, CHANGING IDENTITIES IN SOUTH ASIA 393 (Kenneth David ed., 1977).
17.
See generally DUMONT, supra note 10; Barnett, supra note 16.
15.
16.
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479

racism) or justified as appropriate within, though only within, a particular
domain of interaction (the family).
Thus, hierarchy in the medieval world must be distinguished from
inequality in contemporary society. Medieval hierarchy reflected society's
understanding of what should be; contemporary inequality contravenes an
ideology of equality. So, for instance, Americans may describe a racial or
gender group as inferior and then disclaim the implications of that
description. In contrast, in medieval Europe and caste India, the value of
hierarchy was not debated or debatable. Inequalities were taken to reflect an
inexorable reality and therefore did not require justification.
During the feudal era, the family was securely moored within, and clearly
reflected, the wider social order. Families were not clearly set off from the
rest of society as social units of particular value. Indeed, in the medieval
world, families, largely understood as necessary to the "transmission of life,
property and names, . . . did not penetrate very far into human
sensibility.,18 Rank and duty, within families and without, were understood
as the inevitable consequences of birth. Choice, in determining the scope
and meaning of familial obligations, although never entirely absent, was
neither prevalent nor prized.

II. MYTHS OF FAMILY AND OF CHILDREN

Maine's distinction between a world of status and a world of contract
reflects contemporary, contrasting visions of family.' 9 The solidity and
enduring loyalty associated with traditional families can be, and often are,
understood as the consequence of generally hierarchical, non-negotiable, and
inexorable relationships. In contrast, families created and organized through
principles of contract can be, and often are, understood to be loving
collectivities of autonomous individuals, connected by choice and therefore
equally free to terminate their connections. These distinctions have become
central, as ideological positions, to the contemporary world in which the
"politics of family" have come to define what is valuable.
The notion that families can be categorized into two broad sorts, one
reflecting the parameters of status and the other, the parameters of contract-

18.

PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 411

(Robert Baldick trans., 1962).
19. The historic aspects of Maine's work have been criticized widely. See Janet L. Dolgin,
Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood.- An Illumination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF.
L. REV. 515, 519 n.12 (1990) (considering place of Maine's work in anthropological and legal
scholarship).

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

as if to suggest that some families have retained traditional forms of
interaction and others have evolved with the modern world-is belied by a
far more complicated and far more illusive sociological reality. 20 Most, if
not all, families reflect both images. Social consciousness of the apparent
choice, however, allows traditional families to become more "traditional"
and modern families more "modern" by express comparison, each with the
other. Each identity depends on, and develops in response to, the other. As
the English anthropologist, Marilyn Strathern, has observed, at times our
society wants to entertain tradition and modernity at once.21 She writes:
[F]or contemporary Euro-American culture, we could say that
there is both more status and more contract around-more appeal
to genetic essentialism and more openness to optive kinship. And
if there seems to be 'more', it is because Euro-Americans imagine
they are able to do more things with their ideas, implement them in
more situations. We can point to one source of enablement,
'technology'. . . . In truth, the new reproductive technologies
enable moderns to choose between 'traditional' and 'modern' forms
of relating, 22
or to choose to facilitate both at the same time for that
matter ....

A. The Development of the Ideology of Family
The conflation of images of family suggested by Strathern's description
indicates a broad social interest in preserving that aspect of traditional
families that promises enduring commitment and responsibility and at the
same time joins with the presumptions of autonomous individuality and
equality that encourage choice in all matters. The obvious confusions
engendered by these essentially contradictory impulses are fundamental to
the scope and meaning of the family today. These confusions reflect older
and broader patterns of change in the family that are rooted philosophically
in the Enlightenment. These patterns of change, although unacknowledged
and unappreciated for many decades, became more obvious by the early
years of the Industrial Revolution. The myths of family created in the late
20.
Some of my earlier articles, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" of Reproduction:
Reproductive Technologies and the Parent-Child Bond, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1261 (1994), tended to
reify the ideological distinction between contract and status. This Article should correct that
tendency. I am grateful to Professor Jana B. Singer for her insightful comments on The "Intent" of
Reproduction.
21.
Marilyn Strathern, New Knowledge for Old? Reflections Following Fox's Reproduction
and Succession 22 (1993) (draft, on file with author).
22.
Id. (citations omitted).
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eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution
seemed to assure the utter triumph of contract, depended heavily on
romanticized understandings of the feudal order. These myths were the
fabricated images of an earlier society that virtually sanctified the family in
general, and children in particular.
Although the past several decades have witnessed a remarkable
elaboration in the notion of choice in the creation and maintenance of family
life, the contrast between a world defined in terms of status and one defined
in terms of contract was clearly developing in Western culture by the
nineteenth century. It was not an accident that Maine, affected by the
concerns and confusions of his own world, described the development of
Western society as a movement
from status to contract and associated status
23
firmly with the family.
Indeed, in the nineteenth century a new awareness of family developed.
Society, and especially the middle classes, valued tradition but constructed
conceptions of traditional families to suit contemporary needs rather than to
reflect accurately what had been. 24 Moreover, at the same time, the
American family faced real changes in patterns of family life. During the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, paternal authority weakened and
marriage increasingly became a matter of individual choice. 25 The family,
no longer alone in providing for the educational and welfare needs of its
members, was more often expected to "provide romance, sexual fulfillment,
companionship, and emotional satisfaction." ' 26 Moreover, the divorce rate
rose noticeably by the late nineteenth century, 27 birthrates decreased,
especially within middle class families, and women, in large numbers, began
to work for wages.28
During the nineteenth century, relations among adult family members
began to resemble relations within the market: relations built on free choice
rather than on bonds of inexorable truth. At the time, the change, although
momentous, was generally disapproved.
Countervailing images of the
family developed that depended on, and elaborated, a contrast between home
and work. The family constructed in contrast to, and as a refuge from, the
23.
family).

See note 12 and accompanying text (quoting Maine on the connection between status and

24.
See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE (1992).
25.
STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 19, 20 (1988)

26.
27.
divorce.
divorce.
28.

Id. at 108.
Id. at 108. For example, in San Francisco in 1916, 25% of all marriages terminated in
At the same time, 20% of marriages in Los Angeles and 14% in Chicago ended in

Id. at 108-09.
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demands of the working world, was represented by images of nurturing
women and their treasured children. The image of home, populated by
women and children, rejoined in the evening by working men, provided a
comforting ideological counterpoint to the vast technological and economic
changes of the nineteenth century market.
In this developing view of family, hierarchy was preserved, with women
29
and children understood, socially and biologically, as subservient to men.
But at the same time, society's conception of the family was infused with
romanticism. Perhaps for the first time in history, the family began to be
seen as a product of history and nature, and therefore, potentially subject to
unexpected and unlimited change.
Thus, in responding initially to the astonishing changes in culture and
family that coincided with the full development of the Industrial Revolution,
society constructed a vision of old-fashioned, decent families that
perpetuated, but did not accurately reflect, the perception of families as they
existed before the early nineteenth century. This conception provided a
reference point for connecting the past to the future and a model for living
that preserved the illusion of stability in the midst of wide-scale
transformation.
This ideology 30 of family, centered around the differences between
relationships at home and relationships at work, was fully developed and
widely, almost universally, embraced in the United States in the middle of
the twentieth century. At this time, the widely projected images of the
family reflected the notion that the world of home and love was, and should
remain, separate from the world of work and money. In contrast to the
universe of home, the universe of work, with money as the medium of
exchange, was understood to value autonomous individuals viewed as free to
design and negotiate the terms of their own interactions.
In the marketplace, relationships were not expected to last beyond the
bargains that effected them. They sometimes did, of course. But then they
were re-categorized as friendship or family relations. In contrast, at home,
with love understood as the medium of interaction, relationships were not
defined in light of specific goals, and were understood as loyal and
enduring. 3 1 Within the family, relationships and their attendant rights and

29.

See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD 5-29

(1978).
30.
See supra note 1 (explaining use of term "ideology").
31.
The American anthropologist David M. Schneider described the American family in the
mid-1960s as a universe of "enduring, diffuse solidarity." DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN
KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 51 (1980).

Schneider wrote:
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duties were understood as anchored in the "nature of things" and therefore
not open to negotiation.
This conception of family was embraced with remarkable consistency in
the fifteen years following World War II, but soon thereafter was
increasingly subject to criticism and even contempt. Betty Friedan's The
Feminine Mystique,32 which described housewives as intellectually and
spiritually arrested, became a symbol of a new self-consciousness about, and
criticism of, family relationships. This new self-consciousness and the
critiques it engendered followed inevitably as the gap between images of
family and the reality became almost impossible to ignore.
To some extent, the ideology of family that seemed to reign unopposed
during the middle years of the twentieth century, and presently is challenged
by an alternative vision, continues to inform legal and social choices. To a
remarkable extent, however, the family has been and is being redefined in
terms much closer to those that only three or four decades ago were
associated almost exclusively with the marketplace.
Within the past few decades, an alternative vision of family, clearly but
quietly present since the nineteenth century, has been elaborated and has
begun to emerge as an increasingly real possibility. As a result, visions33of
old-fashioned families compete with visions of "families through choice."

The set of features which distinguishes home and work is one expression of
the general paradigm for how kinship relations should be conducted and to
what end. These features form a closely interconnected cluster.
The contrast between love and money in American culture summarizes this
cluster of distinctive features. Money is material, it is power, it is impersonal
and unqualified by considerations of sentiment or morality. Relations of work,
centering on money, are of a temporary, transitory sort. They are contingent,
depending entirely on the specific goal-money ...
• .. [T]he opposition between money and love is not simply that money is
material and love is not. Money is material, but love is spiritual. The spiritual
quality of love is closely linked with the fact that in love it is personal
considerations which are the crucial ones.
Personal considerations are a
question of who it is, not of how well they perform their task or how efficient
they are. Love is a relationship between persons. Morality and sentiment in
turn are the essence of the spiritual quality of love, for they transcend small
and petty considerations of private gain or advantage or mere gratification.
Id. at 48-49.
32.
33.

BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
See, e.g., KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE:

LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1991).

Weston argues firmly that families by choice should not be imagined in absolute opposition to
traditional families. Rather, she claims, families by choice "undercut procreation's status as a
master term imagined to provide the template for all possible kinship relations." Id. at 213.
This Article also refers to families-through-choice as "modern" families.
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B. The Centrality of Children to the Ideology of Family
Children were central to the myth of family that developed during the
nineteenth century and flowered in the first half of the twentieth century. In
the myth, the family associated itself with tradition-understood as inherently
decent and proper-through increasingly romanticized conceptions of
childhood and children.
Ironically, however, images of childhood,
connected to good, old-fashioned traditional family life, are products of the
modern, not the ancient, world.
The view of children and childhood as a distinct stage of life between
infancy and maturity seems itself to have developed as a historic product of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 34 Medieval families lacked a
coherent notion of childhood beyond infancy. 35 Soon after weaning, at about
age seven, children entered the adult world of work, dress, and play. The
development of the notion of childhood beyond infancy as a special stage in
human development, during which young people require specific forms of
socialization and education, permitted the emergence during the nineteenth
century of families understood as moral units. These moral units
focused on
36
bonds of responsibility that connected parents to their children.
Even in the history of the United States, children were not always valued,
and the idea of childhood was not always central to conceptions of family
life. In colonial America, children seem to have been loved 37 but were not
valued as "unique individuals" and did not form an essential part of their

34.
ARIES, supra note 18, at 15-25.
35.
See generally id. (describing the development of the modem notion of childhood during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
36.
Id. at 411-15. Aries described the conception of childhood that began to develop after the
demise of feudalism as having allowed society to view families as having "a moral and spiritual
function" right at their core. Id. at 412.
37.
The English preacher, Benjamin Wadsworth, admonished parents to love and provide for
their children and to "restrain, reprove, correct them, as there is occasion." Benjamin Wadsworth,
The Well-Ordered Family (1719), reprinted in part in 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 34-36 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1970). Wadsworth wrote:
A Christian householder should rule well his own house. . . . Children
should not be left to themselves, to loose end, to do as they please; but should
be under tutors and governors, not being fit to govern themselves. ...
Children being bid to obey their parents in all things . . . plainly implies that
parents should give suitable precepts to, and maintain a wise government over
their children; so carry it, as their children may both fear and love them.
Id. at 35.
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39
parents' identity. 38 Young children were routinely hired out as servants,
and many children came to America forcibly as indentured servants. 40 This
pattern survived even into the nineteenth century, when parents were still
able to indenture their children through contractual arrangements that gave
no rights to the indentured children and only contractually delineated rights
to the parents. Today such arrangements would be invalid as violating a
public policy of protecting children and their families.4 2
Somewhere between the colonial period and the end of the nineteenth
century, dramatically altered views of children were cemented in the law and
in larger society. 43 As Ann Mason has suggested: "The colonial view of
children as helping hands in a labor-scarce economy gave way [by the midto late-nineteenth century] to a romantic, emotional view of children." 4
Subsequently, that view became almost unassailable.
So, around the notions of children and childhood, nineteenth century
society erected a nostalgia for a familial world in which choice was only
incidental and in which hierarchy, valued as a reflection of nature itself, was

38.
STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS
AMERICAN FAMILIES 1600-1900 87 (1988).

OF PRIVATE LIFE:

A HISTORY

OF

39.

Id.

40.

MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY

OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1994). In the mid-seventeenth century, the
English Privy Council gave permission to the Virginia Company to force children onto ships headed
for the colonies. Id. at 1.
And if any of [the children] shall be found obstinate to resist or otherwise
to disobey such directions as shall be given in this behalf, we do likewise
hereby authorize such as shall have the charge of this service to imprison,
punish, and dispose any of those children . . . and so to ship them out for
Virginia with as much expedition as may stand with conveniency.
Id. at 2 (quoting Act of the Privy Council of England, 1619-1621 (London, 1930), cited in 2
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 8 (Robert H. Bremner ed.,
1970)).
41.
1 am grateful to Professor Katherine Stone for calling my attention to the importance of
indenture agreements involving children.
42.
The comparison between such contracts and surrogacy contracts is obvious, although the
differences are equally clear. Much of the opposition to surrogacy stems from the sense that it
resembles contracts-of-indenture (or even slavery). See, e.g., Nancy W. Machinton, Comment,
Surrogate Motherhood: Boon or Baby Selling-The Unresolved Question, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 115,
126 (1987).
43.
In 1869, a New York court invalidated a contract by which a mother had indentured her
nine-year old daughter on the grounds that "[tlhe laws of nature have given her an attachment for
her infant offspring which no relative will be likely to possess in an equal degree."
People v.
Gates, 57 Barb. 291, 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1869) (quoting People v. Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 47, 70
(N.Y. 1839)); see also MASON, supra note 40, at 49-50 (discussing People v. Gates).
44.
MASON, supra note 40, at 50.
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central.4 5 Ironically, of course, children held only a minor place in the
world to which the nineteenth century looked back with nostalgia.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the notion of family in American
society centered definitively around children. Newly married couples were
referred to as "not yet family," and children, once understood primarily as
obligations until they reached their productive years, had become
"treasures"-at least to middle-class parents. 46 As adults became freer to
design the terms of their relationships, children increasingly cemented
families together, in conception, if not in fact. Even into the second half of
the twentieth century, as the law increasingly sanctioned changes in the
actual structure and pattern of family life, the law continued to define images
of children as special and unchanging, and to depend on those images in
regulating family matters.
Twentieth century psychological literature accurately reflects the view of
childhood and child-centered families that flowered in the early twentieth
century.
Neil Postman, describing a wide group of twentieth-century
psychologists, including Jean Piaget, Harry Stack Sullivan, Karen Horney,
Jerome Bruner, and Lawrence Kohlberg, attributes a consistent view of
childhood to them all. Postman writes:
No one [of these psychological theorists] has disputed that children
are different from adults. No one has disputed that children must
achieve adulthood. No one has disputed that the responsibility for
the growth of children lies with adults. In fact, no one has
disputed that there is a sense in which adults are at their best, their
most civilized, when tending to the nurture of children. For we
must remember that the modem47 paradigm of childhood is also the
modern paradigm of adulthood.
Postman provides this description while asserting that the view of childhood
assumed by psychologists is disappearing. 48 However that may be, people
continue,
as Postman easily acknowledges, to hold images of childhood
49
dear.
45.
Generally today, though not always, this nostalgia minimizes the hierarchical components
of traditional family life.
46. MASON, supra note 40, at 50.
47. NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 63 (1982).
48. Neil Postman argues that the notion of childhood that probably developed in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and that he connects to the invention of the printing press, is threatened
by, and will in all likelihood not survive, the development and widespread use of electronic media

(including, in particular, television). Id. at 20-36, 120-42.
49. Neil Postman argues convincingly that the notion of childhood may be disappearing from
the modern world. Id. Postman notes that just now, when in his view childhood as a notion is
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C. The Response of the Law to Changing Images of Families and Children
Images of children and of the value of childhood play an essential role in
the law's treatment and definition of families and have done so for over a
century. A deep nostalgia for a world that protected children continues to be
reflected in the decisions of courts reenforcing, or more self-consciously
50
advocating, the development of non-traditional family structures.
In the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century,
American law widely and expressly opposed the shifts that were
transforming family life. In fact, the development of family law as a discrete
area of American civil law was encouraged by an interest in stemming social
changes that were profoundly altering patterns of domestic life.
So,
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the law reacted against changes
affecting the American family by imposing harsh new definitions and
prohibitions. For instance, acknowledging and responding to the rise in
divorce by the late-nineteenth century, state legislatures widely reduced the
grounds and toughened the procedures through which people could
divorce. 5 1 For similar reasons, states widely restricted the availability of
52
contraception and forbade abortion for the first time.
Thus, for many decades, legislatures, and the courts to a lesser extent,
failed to endorse the new realities of social and domestic life. 53 Ultimately,
however, the legal restrictions failed to contain the processes of change. For
example, despite the promulgation of laws that prohibited contraception and
disappearing, childhood has become a popular subject for historical analysis.

He explains the

apparent oddness of that fact:

As if to confirm Marshall McLuhan's observation that when a social artifact
becomes obsolete, it is turned into an object of nostalgia and contemplation,
historians and social critics have produced, with the past two decades, scores of
major works on childhood's history, whereas very few were written between
say, 1800 and 1960. . . Historians usually come not to praise but to bury.
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
50.
See infra notes 258-66 and accompanying text (discussing use of best interest standard by
court validating surrogacy contract); see also Dolgin, supra note 19, at 535-45.
51.
MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 25, at 109.
52.

ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR:

MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL

MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 66-70 (1992).
In 1873, the U.S. Congress passed a bill called the
Comstock Law (after New York's "purity campaigner," Anthony Comstock) that punished the
transmission or importation of materials that provided information about conception or abortion
with up to ten years at hard labor and/or a $5,000 fine. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 176-77 (1985). Abortion
was made a statutory crime in the United States about fifty years earlier. But the early anti-abortion
statutes generally preserved the common law rule that tolerated termination of a pregnancy before
"quickening" (the mother's first recognition of fetal movement). Id. at 160.
53.
Courts were often reluctant to enforce the stringent new statutory laws in particular cases.
MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 25, at 109.
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abortion, family size continued to decline; 54 husbands and wives noted the
new, strict laws that expressly prohibited contraception and abortion, and
opposed those laws through "silent practice.",5
Eventually, the law relented, and by the second half of the twentieth
century, the law began to tolerate, and then actively endorse, changes in the
family. 56 By this time, more than half of American marriages ended in
divorce, and approximately onl one-third of families consisted of two
parents and their minor children.
Indeed, once state legislatures began expressly to recognize and to
provide for comparatively easy divorce, every state reacted quickly and with
minimal hesitation to amend its divorce laws in the same direction.5 8 Other
changes in the 1970s reflect a similar acceptance by the law of negotiation
and choice in family matters, at least insofar as adults are concerned. For
example, courts began to accept cohabitation contracts5 96 and began to
enforce ante-nuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce. 0

54.
Divorce rates continued to rise and birthrates to fall. Id. at 109-10.
55.
Id. at 170.
56. A similar social controversy about shifts in the family that favor increased individuality
and choice is reflected in the contemporary debate about the proper form for, and ultimate fate of,
the family. Thus, for instance, same-sex relationships have been approved by a number of
municipal ordinances providing for the registration of domestic partnerships regardless of a couple's
gender. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii declared Hawaii's marriage statute to be
presumptively unconstitutional for limiting marriage to opposite-gender couples. Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). However, reactions against these changes have been forceful. See,
e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 94-1166, 1995 LEXIS 43 (Va. Apr. 21, 1995) (deciding child's best
interests served by award of custody to grandmother rather than to lesbian mother).
57.
Elaine Tyler May, Myths and Realities of the American Family, in 5 A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LIFE 583 (Antoine Prost & Gerard Vincent eds., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1991).
58.
In the United States, California became the first state to eliminate fault grounds for
divorce in 1969. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 67 (1987).
In 1985, when South Dakota adopted mixed
grounds for divorce, no state failed to provide for some sort of no-fault divorce. Id. at 69. Many
states combined the new no-fault grounds with the traditional rule that predicated divorce upon the
faulted conduct of one spouse. Id. at 69, 78.
59.
See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (enforcing nonmeretricious
contracts between unmarried cohabitants); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980)
(sustaining express contract between unmarried cohabitants).
60. Such agreements, when entered in contemplation of divorce, were unenforceable on the
grounds that they violated a public policy that favored marriage. In 1970, Florida recognized such a
contract. Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970). The court in Posner took judicial
notice of the increase in the number of divorces as compared to marriages in the society. Id. at
384; see also Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1982); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d
810 (Mass. 1981).
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During the same period, the United States Supreme Court decided that
some laws restricting contraception and abortion were unconstitutional. 6'
These decisions definitively unraveled the harsh, earlier responses of state
legislatures to the changes that had begun to alter the family during the
nineteenth century. More importantly, however, the Supreme Court, in
declaring prohibitions on contraception and abortion unconstitutional,
appropriated a new vision of family that replaced the notion of family
autonomy with the notion of individual autonomy. 6 2
The Court was explicit. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, for instance, the Court
considered and declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that
prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried adults. The Court
explicitly disclaimed a view of family as anything other than a collection of
separate, autonomous individuals:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally64affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.
Thus, increasingly with regard to adults, the law has endorsed, and now
reflects widely, the changes that redefined family relationships as founded in
individual choice and negotiation rather than as anchored on higher natural,
or supernatural, truths.
With regard to children, however, the law is even now reluctant to
abandon the notion that children occupy a special status within the universe
of the family and within society more generally. To a significant extent, the
law still views childhood as a status imposing limits not imposed on
autonomous individuals and demanding protection not provided to adults
within families. Thus, with regard to children, and children's relations to
their parents, the law continues to endorse traditional views more firmly than
elsewhere. 65 More importantly, images of children are invoked to support
61.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (granting women limited right to abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional Massachusetts statute that
prohibited dissemination of birth control to unmarried adults); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut birth control statute).
62.
See Dolgin, supra note 2.
63.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
64. Id. at 453.
65.
Despite the law's continued understanding of childhood as a special status with important
moral and legal implications, the law also has accepted an alternative vision of childhood within the
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virtually every contemporary position about family. Every variety of family
can be, and has been, both praised and condemned through references to its
effects on children.
III. CONTRADICTORY SOCIAL IMPULSES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE BESTINTEREST STANDARD

The law's apparent concern with the welfare of children has been
pervasively institutionalized in the United States during the past century in
the form of the best-interest standard. That standard is widely applied to
resolve disputes involving the custody, and to some extent the parentage, of
children. That the interests of children should be considered in determining
parentage66 and custody was almost unimaginable before the nineteenth
century .
When courts began to examine children's interests in deciding their fate,
society already had adopted, and was fast elaborating, a view of family that
centered around children and notions of childhood. The legal recognition of
children developed along with, and as a part of, the widespread changes in
social images of family that were elaborated during the Industrial
Revolution. This process is reflected in the law's response to a number of
matters involving children, including child abuse and neglect, foster
parentage, the termination of parental rights, and custody decisions in cases
of parental divorce. The last matter reflects with particular clarity the law's
changing responses to children's interests.6 7

past few decades. On the one hand, the law, reflecting the larger society, seeks to preserve an
image of the family that places children and the parent-child bond directly at the family's center, as
an inexorable connection that guarantees enduring commitment. From this perspective, the law
understands its treatment of children to flow inevitably from the fact that children live in families,
and are central to the very meaning of family. On the other hand, the law, also reflecting the larger
society, has begun in the past several decades to view children as autonomous actors whose rights
and obligations do not invariably depend on their status as children within families. See In re
Gregory Kingsley, No. JU90-5245, 1992 WL 551484 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1992), rev'd, 623
So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In Gregory Kingsley, the trial court gave a minor standing to
begin proceedings to terminate his mother's parental rights. The appeals court denied this right to a
minor.
66. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
67. Parallel explorations of the complicated and contradictory uses that the law makes of the
best-interest standard in other contexts, although beyond the scope of this Article, could provide a
useful elaboration of the conclusions reached here.
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A. Custody Decisions Before the Best-Interest Standard

Custody disputes arise in a variety of contexts including divorce, the
death of a child's parents, and a determination by the state that parents have
failed to fulfill minimally their parental role. In all of these contexts, today,
the state is compelled to consider the best interests of the children involved
in deciding what action to take. However, as often as not, those interests are
in fact ignored or displaced by other interests, generally by the interests of
the adults involved.
Today, most custody disputes originate in divorce. 68 Divorce was rare
before the nineteenth century, 69 but when it did occur, the law had to
determine custody for the children involved.
In doing so, English common
law virtually ignored the "welfare" of children. This was not a selfconscious attempt to subvert the interests of children. No inquiries into
children's interests were considered and then rejected. Rather, almost no
one imagined that a child's interests could be relevant to determinations of
custody. In the colonial period, children were generally not even mentioned
in divorce petitions, and when they were, it was not to invoke the children's
S71
interests but to indicate that the marriage of their parents was longstanding.
Traditionally, the common law, reflecting Roman law, viewed children as
belonging to their fathers who had a moral, but not a legal, obligation to
support their children. A father, in this view, had "the perfect legal
right . . . to the possession and control of his child.", 72 Thus, the father
almost invariably gained custody, even in cases in which the child's welfare
would obviously be ill-served by paternal custody.
In Rex v. De
Manneville,73 often noted to show the tenacity of that rule, 74 an English court
gave custody of a nursing baby to its father in spite of the uncontested claim
by the mother that her separation from the father was caused by his extreme
cruelty.7
By the mid-nineteenth century, changes in the law's treatment and
understanding of children began to appear in England. At this time, mothers
68.
MASON, supra note 40, at 121.
69. See MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 25, at 108.
70. Today, the best-interests standard is applied in custody cases occasioned by divorce as
well as in cases involving parental abuse or neglect. This article focuses on the development and
use of the standard in the divorce context. However, a similar analysis could be provided with
regard to the consideration of children's best interests in cases that involve abuse or neglect.
71.
MASON, supra note 40, at 16.
72.
In re Kottman, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 363, 364 (1834).
73.
5 East. 221, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804).
74. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 492 (2d ed.
1991).
75.
102 Eng. Rep. at 1054.
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were given a statutory right to seek custody of young children.
Similarly,
at the same time in the United States, courts began to question rigid
adherence to a rule that virtually always granted custody to fathers .7
Although fathers' custodial rights generally remained paramount in
American courts during the nineteenth century, such rights were increasingly
predicated on a father's obligation, both moral and legal, to support and
educate his children. 78 Although many American courts preferred fathers in
custody cases as late as the early twentieth century, the courts' findings were
changing. Preference for fathers was no longer automatic. Rather, the
courts began to limit their preference for fathers as a result of the courts'
attention to the welfare of the children involved. By this time, courts in the
United States were willing to4rant custody to mothers in cases in which the
father had been proven unfit.
As early as the middle of the nineteenth century, some courts in the
United States began to embrace the welfare of the child as the crucial
principle in determining a child's custody. Even before the Civil War, a few
American courts focused on the interests of children involved in custody
disputes rather than on the rights of the disputing adults. 8° In 1840, a New
York court, granting custody to a divorcing mother with a two-year-old
child, stated clearly that "[t]he interest of the infant is deemed paramount to
the claims of both parents. ",81 Further, the court explained that the interest
of the child lay with maternal, rather than paternal, custody because "the law
of nature" attached mothers, more strongly than fathers, to their young
children.
Thus, the court, although justifying its decision by reference to
natural truth, suggested that natural truth was itself fungible-or at least

76. Infants Custody Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 12.
77.
See Lewis Hochheimer, The Law in its Relation to the Child, 67 CENT. L.J. 395, 395
(1908).
78.
Note, Reciprocity of Rights and Duties Between Parent and Child, 42 HARV. L. REV.
112, 113 (1928).
79.
Comment, Custody and Control of Children, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 460, 462 (1936)
(citing Schnuck v. Schnuck, 173 S.W. 347 (Ky. 1915); Jones v. Jones, 91 S.E. 960 (N.C. 1917);
Regenvetter v. Regenvetter, 213 P. 917 (Wash. 1923); In re Knoll Guardianship, 167 N.W. 744
(Wis. 1918)).
80.
See, e.g., Foster v. Alston, 7 Miss. (6 Howard) 406 (1842); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 14 Ga.
657 (1853).
81.
Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 102 (N.Y. 1840). Two years later, the
father obtained custody. The child, whose earlier physical frailty had convinced the court to place
custody with the mother, was now healthy and was thus given to the father whose claims, all else
being equal, were still considered "superior to those of the mother." People ex rel. Barry v.
Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
82.
Mercein, 25 Wend. at 106.
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debatable. After all, other courts had long assumed that
custody belonged to
83
fathers as a matter of natural-or supernatural-truth.
B. The Institutionalizationof the Best-Interest Standard
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the old rules for resolving
family disputes, including those relevant to the determination of custody in
cases of parental divorce or separation, were clearly being challenged by
new, and not yet fully developed, understandings of family. New rules
appeared as old assumptions about familial relationships became less secure.
More frequently in this context, courts deciding custody matters appeared to
ignore the interests and rights, both natural and historic, of mothers and
fathers and to invoke instead the welfare of the children involved. This new
standard provided remarkable flexibility to a legal system uncertain about
what sorts of families and what kinds of parents the social order endorsed or
would soon endorse.
1. Changing Presumptions
The best-interest standard's apparent focus on the welfare of children
seemed to provide a moral frame within which to determine custody.
However, the changing set of presumptions through which the standard has
been applied to actual children suggests that that moral frame was not itself
anchored to a larger moral order.
For example, at first, the new standard was used to prefer divorcing
mothers to fathers as their children's custodians. That preference was a
product of broader changes in images of the family that were, in large part,
romanticized adaptations of disconcerting aspects of the nineteenth century
marketplace. As men left home each day to work in the marketplace, the
task of socializing and educating children was transferred from fathers to
85
mothers. 84 As a consequence, a reaffirming cult of motherhood developed.
At the same time, the economic value that children had brought to rural
families diminished, thereby eliminating at least one incentive for fathers to
seek custody. Courts justified the new preference for maternal custody
83.
In Blisset's Case, decided in 1774 and generally cited as the first in which the best
interests of a child proved determinative, Lord Mansfield gave custody of a six-year-old child to the
mother because the father had abused both the child and the mother. However, Lord Mansfield
understood the father's right to the child as "natural."
84.
MASON, supra note 40, at 51.

85.

Id. at 50-54.
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through reference to the presumption that mothers make better parents,
especially to young children.8 6 That presumption, so obviously a product of
recent social history, was invoked, like earlier presumptions about the
inevitability of paternal custody, as an obvious truth. This truth, unlike
those of earlier decades, however, followed from at least relatively selfconscious interpretations rather than from unmediated assumptions about the
natural processes through which families come to be.
The best-interest standard, initially linked with, and used in support of, a
new reverence for motherhood in the nineteenth century, soon widened to
support other interests and other understandings of family and its
relationships. In subsequent decades, judicial reliance on this best-interest
standard resulted in different courts reaching entirely different conclusions
about children's best interests. And these divergent interpretations were
presented and justified by almost every court as products
of objective
87
reasoning rather than as the subjective choices that they were.
Courts relying on the best-interest standard to determine custody
disputes8 8 have depended in the past one hundred years upon a wide and
shifting set of presumptions about families and how they should operate.
Among the presumptions associated with, and actualized through, reliance on
the best-interest standard are the following: a presumption favoring paternal
custody for boys, especially for older boys; a presumption favoring a parent
to whom a child seemed most strongly attached in the view of psychiatric
experts; and a presumption favoring a parent chosen by a child deemed old
enough to exercise "reasonable discretion."89
Recently, commentators, 9 courts, 91 and legislatures92 have presumed that
shared custody arrangements ("joint custody") best serve the interests of a
86. See Comment, supra note 79. During the course of the subsequent century and a half,
many additional presumptions about children and their best interests informed courts making
custody determinations in the name of children and their interests.
87. See Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives
and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 56 (1994) (asserting that in determining children's best
interests, "[p]sychological evidence appears to courts as objective and unassailable, vastly
simplifying courts' Solomonic custody decisions and permitting reliance on a class of seemingly
disinterested experts") (footnote omitted).
88. Assumptions about children's best interests, as they began to emerge in the nineteenth
century, are delineated and described in Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American
Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038,
1072-74 (1979).
89. Id. at 1074.
90.
See, e.g., Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: ConstitutionalImperatives, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 27 (1985).
91.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964 (Md. 1986); Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63 (N.J.
1981).

28:4731

NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

divorcing couple's children. Others, however, have criticized joint custody
and have suggested that the arrangement may serve the interests of certain
93
parents but fails in general to provide for the children's best interests.
Thus, this presumption, even more expressly than most of those that
preceded it in the name of children's best interests, has been supported and
elaborated exclusively on the basis of competing sociological and
psychological theories, the subjectivity of which has become increasingly
clear. At present, even the pretense that consequent custody decisions
reflect unchanging truth has evaporated. 94
Other courts have relied on the best-interest standard to effect more
implicit presumptions, reflecting particular judges' visions of what families
are and what they should be. 95 Clearly, the standard does not suggest these
shifting, even opposing, conclusions about the welfare of children whose
parents divorce. The wide variety of presumptions and preferences on
behalf of which the best-interest standard has been invoked suggest a broader
truth. Application of the standard does not, and probably cannot, serve the
best interests of children in custody cases, because particular custody
decisions under the best-interest standard depend on the insight and wisdom,
and thus the world-view, of individual judges. As a result, widespread
disagreements about how to imagine and apply the standard are inevitable.

92.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE, § 4600.5 (West 1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240
(McKinney 1986).
See, e.g., Joanne Shulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody:
93.
Analysis of Legislation and Its Implicationsfor Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
538 (1982); Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinationsat Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 116-17.
94.
See Fitzgerald, supra note 87, at 57.
In Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), the Supreme Court of Iowa
95.
granted custody of a young boy to his maternal grandparents (the Bannisters) rather than his father
(Harold Painter). The child's mother and sister had been killed in an automobile accident, and at
that time, the father had asked his deceased wife's parents to care for the child. Id. at 153. A year
later and newly remarried, the father asked for his child back. Id. The grandparents refused to
give up their grandson. Id. The court based its decision on a comparison of the two households.
Id. at 154-56. The court compared the "dependable, conventional, middle-class, middlewest
background" of the grandparents with the "more exciting and challenging" but "impractical and
unstable" home of the father and determined that, on the basis of this comparison, the "best
interest" of the child would be served by grandparental custody. Id. at 155-56, 158.
More recently, a Virginia court took custody of a young boy from a mother who lived in an
openly lesbian relationship and gave custody to the child's grandmother. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457
S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). The court found the mother an "unfit custodian at this time" because of
"the moral climate in which the child is to be raised," among other things. Id. at 107.
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2. Preferring Adults to Children
A wider irony is evident in judicial applications of the best-interest
standard. In theory, at least, the standard demands that some vision of
children and their interests stand at the heart of every custody decision. In
fact, many-perhaps most-courts that have relied on this standard have
made the interests of children secondary to those of the adults seeking
custody. The standard's remarkable flexibility has allowed courts to place
the interests of contending adults above those of children while masking that
preference by proclaiming, in the very application of the standard, that the
law is guided by the children's interests.
In some part, any effort to decide which of two or more competing adult
custodians will best serve a child's interests demands that attention be given
to the lives and beliefs of the adults. However, the need in actual decisions
to focus on and compare, at least preliminarily, the conduct and situation of
potential custodians often becomes a judicial preference for one or the other
96
which seems to encompass, but effectively erodes, the children's interests.
One recent commentator described judicial applications of the standard to
involve "balancing the positive and negative characteristics of one party
against those of all opposing parties and placing the child with the party best
able to serve the child's needs." 9 7 Although judicial attention to the conduct
of adults seeking custody is almost always essential to the process of
evaluating the child's available options, conclusions about the moral,
psychological, or social traits of adults can easily become conclusions about
custody rather than information that a court uses to discern a child's best
interests. As a result, courts, not always fully conscious of the implications
of their own procedures, frequently substitute the interests of the adults
involved for those of the children.
The best interests of a child can be subverted by a judge who simply fails
to understand the complicated personalities and relationships involved in a
custody case, as well as by a judge who assumes, without analysis, that
middle-class, comparatively mainstream custodians will better serve a child's
interests than poorer or more socially marginal custodians. 98 Thus, the
96.
See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and "Crack" Abuse, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (1991) [hereinafter Parental Alcohol and "Crack" Abuse] (analyzing the
tendency for courts and legislatures to focus on interests of parents rather than of children in
regulating and effecting custody and parentage determinations).
97.
Julie A. Cox, Comment, JudicialEnforcement of Moral Imperatives: Is the Best Interest
of the Child Being Sacrificed to Maintain Societal Homogeny?, 59 MO. L. REV. 775, 775 (1994).
98.
Courts, for instance, continue to make custody decisions on the basis of a custodian's
gender orientation. See, e.g., Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 102 (granting custody to grandmother rather
than mother on grounds that the child's best interests would not be served by residence with lesbian
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interests of the adults may supersede those of children in custody cases
through unarticulated, even unintentional, shifts in a judge's focus and
99
concern.
Moreover, once courts mistake the identification of parental misconduct
for a more comprehensive analysis of a child's best interests, the
misperception can become widespread and can even become
institutionalized.
When this occurs, courts focusing on parental
misconduct assume, often expressly, that single parental behaviors,
particularly behaviors viewed as socially marginal, are significant enough to
determine a child's interests regardless of any other factors that may
characterize the familial situation and the parent-child
relationship, and
10
regardless of the options available for the child. 1
The interests of children in custody cases are sometimes displaced by the
interests of adults on more express grounds. In certain cases, the rights of
parents predominate, as a matter of constitutional law, 10 2 over the best
interests of children. Professor Wendy Fitzgerald has asserted that "[w]here
the parents wield a well-recognized constitutional right, such as the general
right to custody or right to freedom from racial discrimination,
the statutory
0 3
'best interests' mandate for the child is doomed."'
That best-interest standard, developed during a century that identified
children as the center of family life, encourages courts to focus on, select
among, and then affect the interests of adult parties. At the same time, the
replacement of children's interests with those of adults is disguised, or
negated morally, by the name and apparent goal of that same standard.

mother). See also Fitzgerald, supra note 87, at 57 (analyzing Kelly v. Kelly, 524 A.2d 1330 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986), in which case the New Jersey trial court based custody determination on
preference of secularism over mother's strict Catholicism).
99. Other consequences follow. Once courts focus on parental behavior rather than on the
consequences of that behavior for children, parental behaviors that deviate from mainstream images
of proper parenting become more likely to result in a loss of custody. Thus for instance, courts
have made custody decisions on the basis of one parent's religious views, see, e.g., Donald L.
Beschle, God Bless the Child? The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption
Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 (1989), or sexual orientation, see, e.g., Cox, supra note
97, at 786, and have assumed, rather than explored, the effects of the parent's views or behavior for
the children involved.
100. See ParentalAlcohol and "Crack" Abuse, supra note 96 (describing institutionalization of
focus on parental misconduct).

101. Id. at 1235-54.
102. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (overturning a state court decision that
granted custody of child to father because mother had re-married to a man of different race).
103. Fitzgerald, supra note 87, at 61.
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C. Flexibility and Illusion: The Survival of the Best-Interest Standard
At best, a standard that asks courts to focus on children's interests in
determining their custodial arrangement provides little concrete guidance to
courts. At worst, the standard is hopelessly vague. Moreover, although the
standard is expressly geared to focus on and protect children and their
welfare, the standard often focuses on and serves the parents and potential
custodians. Why then has such a standard not only endured but flourished?
In fact, the best-interest standard has been invaluable to the evolution of
family law in the past century for reasons essentially unrelated to children
and ultimately far more essential to adult society than to children and their
welfare. First, the standard has provided an illusion of sanity and stability in
a society undergoing rapid, almost chaotic, change. In this regard, the
standard's most apparent limitation (its failure to provide concrete guidance)
has also been its most consistent advantage (its flexibility). More basic and
more important, the standard consistently has been successful in suggesting,
at least momentarily, that the families it helped construct were more moral
and more decent than apparent alternatives because moral, decent families
and the best-interest standard are presumed to place children at the center.
1. The Flexibility of the Best-Interest Standard
Clearly, a standard that asks courts to effect a child's best interests cannot
offer either uniform or precise guidance. Even statutory formulations are
inevitably open-ended. 104 As a result, judicial applications are highly

104. An example is provided by the statutory definition of a child's best interests currently in
effect in Minnesota. In that state a child's best interests is defined to mean:
.. . all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated by the court including:
1.
the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
2.
the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to
be of sufficient age to express preference;
3.
the child's primary caretaker;
4.
the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and the child;
5.
the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interests;
6.
the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
7.
the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
8.
the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home;
9.
the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
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subjective. 105 Yet, the factors on the basis of which the standard is routinely
criticized indicate the standard's usefulness.
The standard, because
astonishingly flexible, can further a judicial preference for almost any sort of
family and, within the perceived limits of social and cultural acceptability,
can justify almost any judicial decision. This flexibility has been invaluable
to a legal system constantly adjusting itself to altered visions of the family
and, at the same time, anxious to assure itself and the society within which it
operates that it fosters stability, continuity, and decency.
The best-interest standard tolerates, and can be harmonized with, almost
any theory of childhood and familial connection that refrains from denying
expressly the importance of children to families. The consequent ability of
the principle to champion almost any sort of choice regarding children's
custody explains the endurance of the best-interest standard as the central
tenet of American custody law during a century that has witnessed vast
changes in the form and meaning of family. The standard's perseverance
has depended largely on its ability to reflect indiscriminately, and then to
justify, an almost unending series of different, even contradictory, views
about children and their welfare.
By relying consistently on one central principle in making custody
determinations, ° 6 the law has accommodated change, while providing the
illusion of historic continuity. Precisely because the best-interest standard

10.

the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love,
affection, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the
child in the child's culture and religion or creed, if any;
11.
the child's cultural background;
12.
the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to
domestic abuse...
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West Supp. 1991).
105. Little sociological research has carried out with regard to the actual reasons that trial
judges make the custody decisions they make in light of existing precedent and statutory law.
However, one study of judicial determinations of change of support obligations in the context of
parental divorce found that the primary fact that correlated with the sort of support award ordered
was the identity of the judge who issued the order. Kenneth R. White and R. Thomas Stone, Jr., A
Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75
(1976).
106. Even by statutory law or by judicial precedent, judges in all states seek the best interests
of the children involved in custody disputes. HOMER J. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, § 19.4 (1988).
At least three-fifths of the states provide by statute that custody determinations should be based
on conclusions about the best interests of the children involved. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D.
KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND
THE LAW 734 n.45 (2d ed. 1989). These statutes vary with regard to their use of presumptions and
their willingness to allow considerations of parental fault as part of the best interests determination.
Id.
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lacks specificity, it can facilitate a broad spectrum of ideological and
practical ends.
2. Nostalgia in the Service of the Old and the New
However, no other comparatively amorphous principle able to serve the
ends of flexibility could have served the same end. The best-interest
standard not only seemed flexible, but eminently reasonable-and even
morally superior-to a society conditioned for several hundred years to
understand the
protection of childhood as essential to individual and social
07
well-being. "
More particularly, the wide-scale disruptions in family life during the
nineteenth century encouraged the elaboration of a nostalgia for traditional
families.
That nostalgia encouraged, and continues to encourage, the
evidentiary use of children and their interests, both real and symbolic.
Additionally, the nostalgia shows that images connected with old-fashioned,
decent American families are still valued.
The invocation of children to serve the ends of nostalgia bears its own
irony in that children and childhood were not valued especially in the
centuries to which the nineteenth century turned back for appealing images
of family models. But in large part, the strength of the nineteenth century's
yearning for tradition, consistently identified with children's centrality 10in8
family life, is demonstrated by its survival (although in a weakened form)
in the face of the vast transformations in family life and family law during
the past several decades.
The best-interest standard, at least as much as any principle in family law
today, stands for tradition. But it serves the interests of those who, whether
consciously or not, favor modernity and the creation of familial ties on the
model of those between autonomous individuals. The standard can be
associated with almost any positive vision of children and childhood, and can
support almost any tradition or change in tradition.
Without exception, the standard presumes to serve and to protect
children. It has survived for that reason. Yet, as it has been applied, the
standard should convince almost no one that in relying on the standard, the
law and society have, in fact, achieved the best results for children. In a
society for which children and the parent-child bond have come to be
107. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing development of notion of
childhood in about sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
108. See infra parts IV and V (analyzing failure of old models and images to provide frame for
comprehending present changes).
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understood as the surviving vestige and lasting representation of oldfashioned families, the best-interest standard has come to affirm the
continuing significance of traditional families within the social order. At the
same time, the standard has masked, and thus provided a certain comfort to,
the departure from tradition.
Ironically, custodial determinations in divorce cases involving children
affirm the continuing value of families in society while marking the
dissolution of specific families; similarly, the best-interest standard is
extended and preserved not so much because it serves children as because it
gives the illusion of reality to society's continuing nostalgia for the way
families are thought once to have been.

IV. VISIONS OF CHILDREN: RESPONSES TO BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
CHILDREN 109

A similar nostalgia, and a similar attempt to accommodate changes in the
present through comparison with constructed images of a valued past, marks
society's response to the new reproductive technologies. These technologies,
however, present society with remarkable possibilities for manipulating
practically every aspect of human reproduction and, as a result, disrupt
deeply embedded expectations about the ordering of familial relationships.
The effort to assimilate these changes to familiar images of family life
continues, but is increasingly marked by greater contradiction and confusion.
The array of choices available to people having children and forming
families has exploded within the past two decades. It is now possible to
decide not only whether and when to have children, but how to conceive
them and even how to design them. Reproduction can be disassociated from
sexuality; 10 biological maternity can be separated into discrete genetic and

109. 1 am grateful to Professor Larry I. Palmer of Cornell Law School for the term
"biotechnological children." See Larry 1. Palmer, Who Are the Parents of Biotechnological
Children?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 17, 19 (1994). Professor Palmer was not the first to use the term;
however, his use is especially instructive because he suggests expressly the descriptive and ironic
appeal of the term. Id. (describing "biotechnological children" as a "new implicit legal and social
construct[ l").
In fact, this Section concerns children produced through surrogacy arrangements as well as
children produced from use of the new reproductive technologies.
110. Through in vitro fertilization, ova and sperm can be combined in a culture dish. See
Howard W. Jones, Jr. & James P. Toner, Current Concepts: The Infertile Couple, 329 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1710, 1712 (1993).
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gestational aspects;"1 ' the process of reproduction can be halted for extended
periods by freezing gametic and embryonic material and can be resumed
years and probably even decades later;' 2 men with sperm counts that would
previously have precluded biological fatherhood can now become genetic
parents; 1 3 embryos and oocytes 1 4 can be tested for genetic flaws and can be
discarded if found unacceptable. 115
The social consequences of these technologies are equally startling. One
woman can now give birth to identical twins years apart. Two different
women can gestate twin fetuses that may or may not be genetically related to
either of them. A woman may give birth to a baby produced from her
parents' gametes (her genetic sibling) or her grandparents' gametes (her
genetic aunt or uncle). Children can be conceived and born years after the
deaths of their genetic parents.
These are only a few of the novel
possibilities for constructing familial and social relationships that are possible
through reproductive technology.
A. Reproductive Technology's Challenge: A New Order of Confusion
The challenge that these technologies present to social understandings of
family is of a new order. In the past century, vast changes in the terms and
structure of family life were assimilated, even if sometimes fitfully, to
familiar understandings of family. The history of the best-interest standard
from the mid-nineteenth century into the second half of the twentieth century
demonstrates that process. Now, however, the possibility, even the illusion,
111. With gestational surrogacy, one woman gestates an embryo conceived from another
woman's egg. Usually, gestational surrogacy depends on the use of in vitro fertilization. The
gestator does not have a genetic link with the child she gestates and bears.
112. See Owen K. Davis & Zev Rosenwaks, Assisted Reproductive Technology, in TEXTBOOK
OF REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 571, 583 (Bruce R. Carr & Richard E. Blackwell eds., 1993).
113. Single sperm can be injected into an ovum and result in fertilization. The procedure,
called intracytoplasmic sperm injection, was developed in Belgium and was made known in the mid1990s. See, e.g., Shari Roan, A Singular Hope: The Injection of a Lone Sperm into an Egg Can Be
a Boon for Many Infertile Couples, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at El.
114. See Peter Gorner, Pre-ConceptionTest for Down's Syndrome, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1995,
at A4 (describing still-experimental technique for examining genetic structure of oocytes before
conception).
115. Preimplantation diagnosis can be used to avoid the implantation of embryos with genetic
defects. The procedure has been used to identify the sex of embryos conceived with the gametes of
people whose families have sex-linked genetic disorders. Robert Winston, Engineering Our Own
Downfall, THE TIMES (Eng.), Nov. 12, 1994; see also Jiaen Liu et al., Birth After Preimplantation
Diagnosis of the Cystic Fibrosis Delta-F508 Mutation by Polymerase Chain Reaction in Human
Embryos Resultingfrom Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection with Epididymal Sperm, 272 JAMA 1858,
1858 (1994) (describing birth of healthy children despite infertility due to primarily genital form of
cystic fibrosis in male parent).
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of accommodating the changes presented by reproductive technology within
familiar understandings of family vanish. These new changes outdistance
society's ability to respond with even apparent equanimity.
Most startlingly, the social and biological dimensions of family are being
challenged simultaneously. 6 As a result, society can no longer securely
measure social changes in the operation and creation of families against
comparatively unassailable assumptions about biological reproduction.
Those assumptions are equally in disarray. Social and family history offer
little guidance, and in consequence, the rate of change is overwhelming, and
the culture's capacity to comprehend and channel these changes remains
uncertain.
Not surprisingly, in the effort to make sense of such startling shifts in the
family, society, as in the past, invokes familiar images of family life as it is
understood to have existed before the current disruptions intervened.
Central among those images are images of children. The new changes are
approved and condemned in moral terms, even before they are understood,
by measuring their apparent consequences for the welfare of children.
So, specifically, in public presentations, both opponents and proponents
of the new reproductive technologies assess the use of those technologies
against images of traditional family life and images of children within such
families. Advocates and opponents of reproductive technology suggest that
children and the parent-child bond represent the sacred continuing core of
family life and, accordingly, praise or condemn the new technologies
through reference to the consequences of reproductive technology for
children. 117
Underlying these varied claims lie other interests which serve adults far
more than children, and which support the correlates of autonomous
individuality more than those of holism and connection. But now, in marked
contrast to the earlier interplay between the law's invocation of children and
simultaneous focus on adult interests in applying the best-interest standard,
the contradictions cannot be as easily masked or ignored. The semblance of
ordered response to the changing family in earlier decades has yielded to
obvious confusion. The depth of this confusion becomes quite clear when
the law's responses to disputes involving reproductive technology are
examined. Courts are compelled to make specific decisions in order to
116. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations, YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 37 (1995); see also Marilyn Strathern, New Familiesfor Old?, in THE FAMILY IN
THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (Carole Ulanowsky ed., 1995) (analyzing with much insight
possibilities that stem from simultaneous challenge posed by new reproductive technologies to social
and biological dimensions of family).
117. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
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resolve disputes. They must make those decisions quickly, without the
benefits of prolonged debate.
Confusion engendered by reproductive
technology and society's inability to provide any broad, coherent response

emerges transparently.
In society's wider debate, contradictions and confusions in social
responses to reproductive technology can be more easily overlooked. The
depth of the confusion is indicated in the general appeal by almost everyone
considering the moral and social consequences of reproductive technology to
the welfare of children. A panoply of contradictory voices responds to
reproductive technology through a set of similar, and similarly nostalgic,
references to the central role that children play in any decent understanding
of home and family. As the social debate develops, general conclusions by
society as a whole about the value that reproductive technology actually
poses to children or to potential children seem more and more murky.
B. The Meaning of the Children
Those favoring the development and use of reproductive technology and
surrogacy l refer to the enabling capacity of this technology to create happy
families for couples who would otherwise have remained childless. The
children born to (or for) such couples are described as especially cared for
and loved.119 Proponents of reproductive technology focus on concrete
images of normal, even privileged children, whose happy childhoods are
attributed to their technological beginnings. The parents of such children are
118. The use of both surrogacy and the new reproductive technologies appeared at about the
same time, within the last two decades. In fact, so-called "traditional surrogacy" (as compared with
gestational surrogacy) requires no sophisticated technology. It involves only artificial insemination
which has been used with humans for over a century. Surrogacy, however, is often categorized and
considered with the new reproductive technologies because it involves conception without sexual
intercourse and, more importantly, because it disrupts social understandings of how the parent-child
bond can, and should be, created.
This Article uses the term "assisted reproduction" to refer to both surrogacy and the new
reproductive technologies.
119. See, e.g., Linda S. Williams, Biology or Society? Parenthood Motivation in a Sample of
Canadian Women Seeking In Vitro Fertilization, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 261, 266-67 (Helen Bequaert Holmes ed., 1992) (referring to importance to childless
couples of "having a family" or "starting a family"). Endless news articles about reproductive
technology focus on and praise the families that technology creates. See, e.g., Carol Lawson,
Celebrated Birth Aside, Teen-Ager is Typical Now, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at A18 (describing
first child who resulted from use of in vitro fertilization as happy, "typical teen-ager"); Julio Laboy,
State-of-the-Art Stork, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 1993, at 29 (reporting on reunion of joyful parents who
received successful in vitro fertilization treatment at clinic in Brooklyn); Deborah Rissing Baurac,
On the Infertility Front, the Weapons are Many, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1992, at 1 (describing couple
using in vitro fertilization successfully).
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described as better, more caring parents because they yearned for children
who were only produced after unusual expenditures of time, money, and
emotional energy.120
For proponents, assisted reproduction is described as extending and
magnifying, but not distorting, the joys of children and the sanctity of
childhood. Assisted reproduction provides more-not just more children, as
in the multiple births that so frequently result when reproductive technology
is used, but happier, smarter, more secure children. 121 This focus on
children, however, hardly disguises other interests at stake in the use and
development of assisted reproduction-the interests of couples unable to have
children without assistance, the interests of a medical fertility industry with
annual profits of billions of dollars, 122 and, most generally, the interests of
an entire society obsessed with choice.
Those opposing surrogacy reproductive technology also focus on
children, and suggest that children assisted to birth by the new technologies
or through surrogacy arrangements inevitably will suffer serious
psychological, or even physical, 123 harm as a result of their beginnings.
Those harms are then connected to a larger moral order. Opponents of
assisted reproduction focus especially on self-identity problems such children
may face. 12 4
The technology, in particular, is presented as having

120. See, e.g., Chris Mihill, IVF couples: 'Better Parents', THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 10, 1994,
at 8 ("Parents of test tube babies are better mothers and fathers than those of normally conceived
children, and the children seem to suffer no emotional ill-effects ....").
121. See Peter Pallot, Intelligence Test for the Time Warp Twins, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Eng.), Jan. 2, 1993, at 3 (quoting Phil Wright, the father of children produced from cryopreserved
embryos, involved in research on babies produced from such embryos who has described such
children as "hardy and wanted"; "They could be especially bright and affectionate because of all the
attention they get.").
122. See Diane M. Gianelli, Fraud Scandal Closes California Fertility Clinic, AM. MED.
NEWS, June 19, 1995, at 1 (estimating that more than one million patients receive medical treatment
for infertility each year and that the industry's profits are in the billions of dollars).
123. The most likely known physical harm to children produced through the use of
reproductive technology results from the increased chance of multiple births to women taking
fertility drugs. Terry Home, Couples Take the Risk to Conceive a Child, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS,
Sept. 6, 1994, at Al (describing increased risk of prematurity with multiple fetuses); cf Ron
Winslow, Trouble Plagues Preemies Who Are Saved, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1994, at B1,
(describing risks of prematurity).
124. See, e.g., Moral Torpor Spawns Designer Babies, THE OBSERVER (Eng.), Jan. 9, 1994,
at 23 ("The confusion of personal identity that follows the use of donated eggs or sperm is not in the
child's best interests."); see also Donum Vitae: Instructionon Respect for Human Life in its Origin
and on the Dignity of Procreation, THE GIFT OF LIFE: THE PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE VATICAN INSTRUCTION ON REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY app.
at 216 (1990) [hereinafter Vitae] ("The child has the right to be conceived, carried in the womb,
brought into the world and brought up within marriage."). The same document also asserted:
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substituted for, and as thereby precluding the benefits of, familial
connections for the children who result.
Again, the focus on children furthers, and disguises, other interests.
Reproductive technology and surrogacy threaten the traditional order, not
just with regard to the parent-child bond but with regard to almost every
aspect of family life, including marriage. To accept reproductive technology,
for instance, may be to accept divorce, abortion, and the sort of families
within which such choices make sense. Images of children are still
powerfully evocative of traditional families. Thus to the extent that
reproductive technology and surrogacy are presented as harming children,
these phenomena can be forcefully condemned in the name of a past that
protected children and preserved their interests.
Society's developing visions of surrogacy and reproductive technology,
and consequently, of the proper meaning of family, can be further delineated
through exploration of concrete images of children presented in the debate
about the value and fate of surrogacy and the new reproductive technologies.
Further, fertility clinics depend on images of thriving children to support
their work. In recent years, such clinics have attempted to gain publicity,
approval, and thus presumably increased business and funding, by hosting
"reunions" for children produced through reproductive technology and for
those children's grateful parents.
Often, these reunions, held in parks and other public places, have
welcomed the press. The stories that result 125 contrast miraculous
conceptions and births with normal, everyday childhood behaviors. One
such story, typical of the genre, reported on a "reunion," organized by a
fertility clinic and held at a local park that brought together 200 children
conceived through the clinic's assistance along with those children's
parents.126 The reunion-picnic was described as a celebration of the
"medical advancement that, in the words of many, had miraculously changed
A true and proper right to a child would be contrary to the child's dignity
and nature. The child is not an object to which one has a right nor can he be
considered as an object of ownership: Rather, a child is a gift, 'the supreme
Gift'.... For this reason, the child has the right as already mentioned, to be the
fruit of the specific act of the conjugal love of his parents; and he also has the
right to be respected as a person from the moment of conception.
Id. at 223 (emphasis and footnote omitted).
125. See, e.g., Mary E. Hopkins, Fertility Fanfare: In Vitro Program Celebrates Successes
with Reunion, SUAN-SENTINEL, Jan. 1, 1995, at 3; Michael Clancy & Dolores Tropiano, Mom's
the Word at Reunion with Fertility Doctor, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 11, 1994, at B6.
126. Jacques Steinberg, Gathering Shows Growing Acceptance of In Vitro Fertilization:
Parents of 'Test-tube Babies' Hold Picnic to Celebrate Medical Advancement, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 29, 1993, at A49.
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their lives. , 127 The story reported: "While the children played ball, blew
bubbles and hugged the life-size Disney characters who paraded through the
park, many of their parents swapped war stories with one another, just as
they had during similar picnics that have been held each of the past three
years." 128
Certain specific children have been used to portray the value of
reproductive technology. 29 The fifteenth and sixteenth birthdays of Louise
Brown formed the focus of an array of news stories 130 about reproductive
technology. 13' Louise, the first person conceived in vitro, was born in
Oldham, England on July 25, 1978. The stories about Louise's birth and
development reflect the themes of the reunion stories. One such story
began: "A miracle of technology brought Louise Brown into this world, but
that was 15 years ago and now she's just another teenager. ' 32 Another
began with a description of Louise: "In her jeans, floppy rugby shirt and
overpriced running shoes, Louise Brown looks like a typical teen-ager. Her
parents complain that she likes 'loud music and stupid clothes' and much
prefers the company of friends to 'us old codgers. ' ' 133 "But," the story
continued, "if life in the Brown household in Bristol, 34England, is rather
routine, the world's memory of Louise is anything but."'
In each of these generally favorable stories about fertility clinic reunions
and Louise Brown, the miracle, as reported, is supposed to be as much the
unremarkable childhood of those produced through the use of reproductive
technology as it is the technology itself. These stories can only proclaim that
reproductive technology is impressive because it allows for the creation of
typical, and therefore treasured, babies for their loving parents even more

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Louise Brown is the most well-known of such children, but others have been featured in
news stories as well. See, e.g., Kelly Pearce, 'My Parents Tell Me I'm Special': Test-Tube
'Miracles' Celebrate Life, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 1994, at BI (telling story of 9-year-old
gymnast, conceived through use of in vitro fertilization).
130. See, e.g., Sandra Ratcliffe, Louise Brown Talks About Life Under the Microscope From
Day 1, SCOTTISH DAILY RECORD, Jan. 17, 1994, at 2/21; Paul Wells, World's First Test-Tube
Baby-er, Teenager-Visits In-Vitro Clinic, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Oct. 10, 1993, at A3;
Lawson, supra note 119, at A18; Carol Midgley, The Bubbly Louise, DAILY MAIL (Eng.), Mar. 27,
1993, at 3.
131. Louise Brown made the celebration of her 15th birthday a context for supporting the
growth and development of infertility treatment. She agreed to have the day celebrated publically
and two months early in order to coincide with Britain's first National Fertility Week. Midgley,
supra note 130, at 3.
132. Wells, supra note 130, at A3.
133. Lawson, supra note 119, at A18.
134. Id.
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certainly than traditional forms of human reproduction. Louise is described
as being exactly what a teen-age girl should be because her technological
origins ensured a propitious-and thus "normal"-childhood.
Other stories of the same sort focus less intently on children and more on
the needs, frustrations, and successes or failures of parents and potential
parents. These stories detail the anguish of infertile adults, especially
women, who enter treatment for infertility.135 One such story reported the
pain that an infertile 35-year-old woman felt on occasions such as Mother's
Day, and upon seeing women with baby carriages. 136 After months of
treatment, described in detail, the woman and her husband had a child (born
after in vitro fertilization of thawed cryopreserved embryos). The story
concludes with the woman proclaiming that "the good Lord knew He put us
through37such hell to have her [the baby], He figured He'd give us a perfect
1
baby.
A contrasting position, that reproductive technology creates more harm
can also be, and
than good and should be banned or strenuously regulated,
• 138
often is, justified by reference to the interests of children.
The Catholic
Church, for instance, has explained its opposition to assisted reproduction by
referring to the "right" of a child to be conceived only in traditional ways by
a married couple.
Other opponents of assisted reproduction refer to
identity confusions likely to plague babies produced from donated gametes
and to the negative consequences that surrogate motherhood may have for
135. See, e.g., Anne Rochell, Four Bundles of Joy, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Apr. 25, 1995,
at C3 (birth of quadruplets to couple who experienced infertility); Katherine Shaver, Three
Birthdays and an Anniversary, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at Al (birth of triplets after
25 years of marriage); Ellen Lane & Liz Szabo, Using Technology to Conceive, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, Aug. 18, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 9387463 (successful story of infertile
couple); Patti Doten, In Vitro: Testing the Limits, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 1991, at 25 (responses
to in vitro treatments).
136. Cindy Loose, A Holiday Comes to Life, WASH. POST, May 9, 1993, at Al.
137. Id.
138. Feminists who oppose reproductive technology often justify that opposition through
references to the physical and psychological harms that befall women as a result of being treated for
infertility by the medical establishment. See, e.g., Michelle Stanworth, Reproductive Technologies
and the Deconstruction of Motherhood, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER,
MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 10, 16 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987) (describing reproductive
technology's ability "to destroy the claim to reproduction that is the foundation of women's
identity") (footnote omitted); Testimony of Gena Corea before the California Assembly Judiciary
Committee (Apr. 5, 1988), in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 325, 326
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990) [hereinafter SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD] (condemning surrogacy as a
"reproductive supermarket" that uses women as "living laboratories" and that will likely lead to an
"expansion in the traffic in women internationally" to be "used as cheap breeders for white,
Western men").
139. Vitae, supra note 124, at 216.
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children whose social mothers cannot develop a committed relationship to
the fetus as a result of the biological processes of gestation.' 40
These stories suggest that, just as assisted reproduction disrupts society's
understanding of family life, so it disrupts the ability of children produced
through assisted reproduction to form secure personal identities.
Such
children are portrayed as rootless and unhappy-just as the society has been
uprooted by, and should be unhappy about, the continued development and
use of assisted reproduction.
One story about children produced through the use of anonymously
donated semen several decades ago describes a group of angry, confused
adults. 141 The author, acknowledging that "donor-inseminated child[ren]"
who do "take up the hunt"' 142 for their genetic fathers may be especially
unhappy or the products of neglectful homes, describes adults obsessed with
the need to discover their genetic fathers. One such woman, a 45-year-old
legal assistant in California, broke off relations with her mother's husband
(her legal father) after she learned following the death of her mother that her
mother's husband was not her genetic parent. She explained her decision to
drop his last name: "I couldn't spend
the rest of my life writing my name as
143
it was. It felt like a lie every time.'
Opponents of assisted reproduction 144 also voice fears of broader social
consequences. As a group, they fear especially the acceptance of choice,
limited only by technology's own limits, in the construction of family bonds.
That fear relates as directly to adults and the definition of marriage as it
relates to children and the construction of the parent-child bond. The
Catholic Church, in one statement on the moral status of assisted
reproduction, declared expressly:
[M]arriage possesses specific goods and values in its union and in
procreation which cannot be likened to those existing in lower
forms of life. Such values and meanings are of the personal order
and determine from the moral point of view the meaning and limits
of artificial
interventions on procreation and on the origin of human
45
life.

1

140. Moral Torpor Spawns Designer Babies, THE OBSERVER (Eng.), Jan. 9, 1994, at 23.
141. Peggy Orenstein, Are You My Father?, N.Y. TIMES , June 18, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at

28.
Id. at 31.
143. Id. at 50.
142.

144. This discussion does not refer to feminist opponents of reproductive technology.
supra note 138.
145. Vitae, supra note 124, at 208.

See

510
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Other contemporary theologians have similarly condemned assisted
reproduction as morally objectionable because, in the words of
one, assisted
146
reproduction "insist[s] on free choice about human relations."
Thus, for many, the matter of choice is more essential in assessing the
consequences of assisted reproduction than is the matter of children. Yet, all
invoke the children involved and proclaim the importance of the
consequences of assisted reproduction for those children. The fact that
advocates and opponents of assisted reproduction justify their assertions
through references to children and childhood may itself suggest that those
references, at least in part, serve other ends. Assisted reproduction is testing
the meaning and the parameters of the family, and the debate occasioned by
use of assisted reproduction is not only about the consequences for children.
It broadens dramatically, yet continues, the older debate about the moral and
social implications of the individualization and privatization 147 of family
relationships-a debate that began to develop clearly in the mid-nineteenth
century.1 48 Now, as then, images of children provide the powerful focal
point around which the shifting scope of family life can be understood.
Now, however, reliance on those images is becoming less and less
successful in helping to shape and justify concrete social responses. This
becomes obvious when examining the specific responses of the law to cases
occasioned by assisted reproduction. In fact, society has turned to the law,
largely by default, in seeking a stabilizing response to the confusions and
disruptions presented by assisted reproduction.
The response has come in large part from the judiciary,' often unaided
by legislative direction.151
As the law attempts to make sense of the
146. Lisa Sowle Cahill, The Ethics of Surrogate Motherhood: Biology, Freedom, and Moral
Obligation, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, supra note 138, at 151, 163 (writing specifically about

surrogate motherhood arrangements).
147. See generally Singer, supra note 4 (discussing recent changes in family law's approach
toward regulation of family relationships).
148. See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing responses to

shifts in American families in prior decades).
149. Other groups, such as ethicists, doctors, and philosophers have also, of course, attempted
to provide direction. The law, however, has been especially important in society's effort to make
sense of the families produced by reproductive technology because in the face of disputes between
actual litigants, judges must, and have the authority to, respond concretely and definitively.
150. In the United States, judges, rather than legislatures, have been establishing society's
response to the disruptions occasioned by reproductive technology.
151. Legislatures have slowly begun to respond to the charge. Courts, faced with actual
disputes that demand resolution, have thus provided the first general response to the question of
regulating reproductive technology and families formed through use of that technology. The
continuing call of courts in such cases for an appropriate legislative response has become almost
parodic. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988) (noting absence of legislative
guidance in handling traditional surrogacy case and suggesting development of such guidance could
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conundrums presented by assisted reproduction, familiar legal responses
seem inadequate or irrelevant. As the law responds, however, a new
development in society's and the law's understanding of families and of
children, so long invoked as the moral and spiritual center of family life,
becomes apparent.
Images of children and of childhood are being invoked less often, less
securely, and less successfully than they were in earlier cases that raised
questions about custody and parentage.
V. THE CASES: CONTRADICTORY MESSAGES ABOUT CHILDREN
Disputes over parentage or custody of children produced through
reproductive technology as well as disputes about the legal status of frozen
embryos illuminate starkly the pressures that encourage courts to invoke, and
then ignore, children or to presume to protect the interests of children while
actually doing something else.
The contradictions and confusions presented by these cases are not unique
to cases occasioned by reproductive technology but are especially transparent
there. Increasingly, and in a wide variety of cases certainly not limited to
those involving assisted reproduction, courts, like the wider society, sanction
choice and bargained negotiation in the construction of family relationships.
Courts thereby increasingly substitute individuality for holism and permit the
substitution of choice for reliance on notions of natural truth in envisioning
the family. 152
This is so in cases occasioned by reproductive technology and in other
cases now facing courts that involve disputes about a host of family matters,
including divorce, cohabitation, and children's "rights." In deciding these
cases, courts are more and more often sanctioning choice as a central
determinant of family relationships, but they are doing so only with
ambivalence. 153 That ambivalence is often reflected in references to the
continuing value of traditional family forms even in cases in which courts
"1provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the overall implications of the new reproductive biotechnology"); Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-63 3190, slip op. at 15-17 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
Oct. 22, 1990) (noting absence of legislative direction); Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369,
381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting "urgent need for legislative action").
152. See, e.g., MITCHELL REGAN, THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1994); Clare Dalton, An
Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1096-1113 (1985) (analyzing
judicial responses to cohabitation agreements). See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40
UCLA L. REV. 637, 637-40 (1993) (describing contradictory pulls of tradition and modernity on
courts deciding family cases).
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sanction the shift toward families formed through choice and contract. And
among these references, those references to the continuing force and value of
the parent-child bond remain central. However, these references, and other
invocations of children and childhood, seem increasingly hollow or
misplaced.
As family courts more and more often support agendas and principles that
sanction the transformation of the family and of family relations on the
model of the marketplace, these courts, often unwittingly, disguise that
support. Invoking children, and presuming to support their interests in such
cases, can disguise-or at least mitigate-the implications of the role of law
in furthering the transformation of the family from a holistic, hierarchically
organized unit of social life to a collection of autonomous individuals,
connected only insofar as, and only as long as, they choose to be joined.
However, as contradictions between images of traditional families and the
reality of families being created through reproductive technology become
harder to contain, even invocations of children fail to mediate between the
apparent options. As a result, children become less and less central in the
law's regulation of family matters.
The three cases to be considered next illustrate the complexities and
contradictions that emerge as courts attempt to establish custody and
154
parentage in cases occasioned by reproductive technology. Davis v. Davis
elaborates, to the point of derailing altogether, the judicial tendency in cases
involving custody or parentage disputes to disguise one set of interests (those
of the adults) by invoking another set of interests (those of the children).
The New Jersey courts' decisions in Baby "M, ,155 a case presenting social,
more than biological conundrums, show judicial reliance on the best-interest
standard masking other agendas and show as well the complexities that arise
from the use of that standard in cases in which familiar assumptions
about
6
the family have been disrupted. Finally, Johnson v. Calvert shows the
judiciary struggling to redefine old assumptions about children and parentage
as it develops a vision of family that can encompass families that, in their
origins at least, seem entirely unprecedented.

154. No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No.
180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
155. In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
156. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-63 3190 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990), aff'd
sub nom. Anna J.v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), superseded by 822 P.2d
1317 (Cal. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
206 (1993).
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A. In the Interests of Embryos: Davis v. Davis

Among the most vivid illustrations of the law's reliance on the best
interests of children in order to effect agendas that have no real concern for
children or their welfare is a case that did not involve children at all. The
1992 Tennessee case involved a dispute between a divorcing couple, Mary
Sue and Junior Davis, over their respective rights to control seven frozen
embryos produced from the couple's gametes.'5 7 The Tennessee Supreme
Court invoked the interests of the embryos in a manner similar to other
courts' invocations of the best interests of the children of divorcing
couples. 158 In fact, however, the Davis courts were freed of the burden of
considering the concerns, problems, and peculiarities of children because the
court could imagine the embryos in any way at all-or in no way. In cases
involving custody and parentage, United States courts almost universally rest
their decisions on an assessment of the children's best interests. Yet, often,
59
in these cases, the children are not well served by the decisions reached.'
The same disharmony appears in Davis, but here-largely because actual
children were not involved-the extent to which the state supreme court's
reliance on the embryos' interests is a pretext emerges transparently.
Davis v. Davis began as a divorce action involving Mary Sue Davis and
Junior Davis. While married, the Davises wanted to have children. After
Mary Sue suffered a series of ectopic pregnancies, eventually resulting in the
loss of her fallopian tubes, the couple began in vitro fertilization treatments
in 1985 at a fertility clinic in Knoxville, Tennessee. That treatment involved
the fertilization in vitro of Mary Sue's ova with Junior's sperm. 160 During
the next 161few years, the in vitro procedure was tried several times, without
In 1988, the Davises' physician suggested that during the next
success.
treatment any fertilized ova not implanted at that time could be frozen for
future use should Mary Sue not become pregnant during the planned
treatment cycle. In December 1988, nine ova were retrieved. Two were
157. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
158. The trial court in Davis actually defined the embryos as "human life" and therefore
expressly treated them as other courts deciding custody cases handle children and their interests.
Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *30, *34; see infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text
(analyzing trial court decision in Davis).
159. See supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
160. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591-92.
161. Embryo cryopreservation involves freezing fertilized eggs. Eggs in the early stages after
fertilization (often called preembryos or zygotes) can be cooled in various cryoprotectants and then
stored in liquid nitrogen. Robert M. L. Winston & Alan H. Handyside, New Challenges in Human
Cryopreserved embryos can be thawed
In Vitro Fertilization, 260 SCIENCE 932, 933 (1993).
through a reverse procedure that involves decreasing the concentration of cryoprotectant. Davis &
Rosenwaks, supra note 112, at 583.
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implanted in Mary Sue's uterus, but a pregnancy did not result. Seven were
cryopreserved and62stored for future use. A few months later, Junior Davis
filed for divorce.'
The couple agreed about all aspects of the divorce except the fate of the
seven frozen embryos. Initially, Mary Sue wanted the embryos preserved
for eventual implantation in her uterus.' 6 3 Junior wanted them stored, but
never used. 164
Each reached a different
Three Tennessee courts heard the case.
conclusion about the ontological status of the Davises' frozen embryos. To
the trial court, the embryos were children, deserving virtually the same
protection afforded other children in other custody cases. Concluding "that
the seven cryopreserved embryos are human," 165 Judge Young, for the trial
court, determined that "the age-old common law doctrine of parens patriae
controls these children, in vitro, as it has always supervised and controlled
children of a marriage at live birth in domestic relations cases in
Tennessee., 166 The court thus proceeded to analyze the embryos' best
interests; since Mary Sue, but not Junior, seemed ready to "assure [the
67
her. 168
embryos'] opportunity for live birth," 1 the court granted custody to
The trial court, self-consciously concerned with defining the embryos as
humans 169 and with treating the Davises' divorce as involving a run-of-themill custody battle, 17 relied on the best-interest standard to "achieve justice
for the child.' 171 Of course, the court was unable to rely on the best-interest
standard because there was no actual child. Rather, the court was forced to
consider the best interests of frozen embryos, and that consideration differed
significantly from any consideration of a child's best interests. The court
concluded that the embryos were better off in the hands of the party (Mary
162. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
163. Id. at 589. Later, after Mary Sue remarried, she asked that the embryos be donated to an
infertile couple. Id. at 590.

164. Id. at 592. At the time, indefinite storage was considered no different than destruction
because it was not believed that cryopreserved embryos would remain viable for more than a couple
of years. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *36. Later in the proceedings, Junior Davis
expressly asked that the embryos be destroyed. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
165. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *13.
166. Id. at *34.
167. Id.at *37.
168. Id. The court further declared that, "all matters concerning support, visitation, final
custody and related issues be reserved to the Court for further consideration and disposition at such
time as one or more of the seven cryogenically preserved human embryos are the product of live

birth." Id.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at *30.
Id. at *34-35.
Id. at *35 (citing In re Baby "M," 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. 1987)).
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Sue) who hoped .for their eventual implantation, gestation, and birth than in
the hands of the party (Junior) who did not hope for a birth. But granting
temporary custody to Mary Sue Davis, the court expressly delayed decisions
about visitation, support, and final custody until172 "one or more of the . . .
human embryos are the product of a live birth."
The court's reliance on the best-interest standard in this case was far
more important in delineating the court's understanding of the scope of the
dispute than in protecting the interests of, or securing justice for, the frozen
embryos. Whether the court appropriated the best-interest standard because
it actually viewed frozen embryos as essentially indistinguishable from
children, or whether the court self-consciously applied the standard in order
to define the dispute without believing that it could actually discern the best
interests of seven cryopreserved embryos, is hard to know. In either case,
by presuming to resolve the dispute through application of the best-interest
standard, the court defined as irrelevant the real conflicts that reproductive
technology and the cryopreservation of human gametic material present to
the protection of traditional families, and to the safeguarding of traditional
assumptions about familial relationships.
In the trial court's construction of this case, the best-interest standard did
little more than reinforce a view of family that reflected traditional
understandings of familial relationships. By presuming to apply the bestinterest standard to this case, the court tried to mask the contradictions that
separated its traditional view of family from the view of family implied by a
world in which people can choose to create embryos outside a human body,
to freeze and store them, and then, later, to choose whether to discard the
embryos, or to use them to create children or for research.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed the trial court's order that
Mary Sue be given temporary custody of the embryos and instead granted
"joint control" to Mary Sue and Junior. 73 More importantly, the court's
decision had the effect of replacing the image presented by the trial court of
a typical divorcing couple involved in a custody dispute with the more
contractual image of two adults arguing over the right to control something
of value. "Jointly," concluded the74 appeals court, "the parties share an
interest in the seven fertilized ova."
172. Id. at *37.
173. Davis v. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn Ct. App. 1990).
174. Id. at *8 (citing Tennessee statutory law and York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D.
Va. 1989)). In York v. Jones, the court concluded that the Cryopreservation Agreement created a
bailor-bailee relationship between the infertile couple and the infertility clinic. The contract at issue
in York provided: "In the event of divorce, we understand legal ownership of any stored prezygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed and ruled that the Knoxville
Fertility Clinic, storing the Davis embryos, was "free to follow its normal
procedure in dealing with unused preembryos."' 175 However, the supreme
court disagreed with the trial court's and the appellate court's respective
statements of the embryos' ontological status. In the view of Justice
Daughtrey, writing for the supreme court, the trial court erred in defining
the embryos as "children in vitro. " 176 On the other hand, the appellate court
"may have swung too far in the opposite direction.' 177 The court was
178
especially troubled by the appellate court's reliance on York v. Jones,
because that case stated expressly that frozen embryos can be property.
Equally unhappy to view the embryos as people and to view them as
property, the court found a third, intermediate option. Justice Daughtrey
relied on the ethical standards of the American Fertility Society for its
understanding of the embryos' ontological status. That society, like Justice
Daughtrey, rejected the view that embryos are "human subjects" 79as well as
the view that they are no different than "any other human tissue."'1
The Society suggested an alternative vision:
A third view-one that is most widely held-takes an intermediate
position between the other two. It holds that the preembryo
deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not
the respect accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is due
greater respect than other human tissue because of its potential to
become a person and because of its symbolic meaning for many
people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because it has not
yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as

court of competent jurisdiction." 717 F. Supp. at 424. The court expressly treated the embryo at
issue in the case as property, finding that the infertility clinic had "fully recognize[d] plaintiffs'
property rights in the pre-zygote and . . . limited [its] rights as bailee to exercise dominion and
control over the pre-zygote." Id. at 427.
175. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604-05. The supreme court explained its decision to use the term
"preembryo" rather than "embryo," id. at 594, to refer to fertilized eggs in the few days
immediately following fertilization. The trial court, as Justice Daughtrey for the supreme court
recognized, was careful to refer to this entity as an embryo because that label supported the trial
court's position that personhood begins at conception. Id.
176. Id. at 594. The supreme court reviewed Tennessee and United States law relating to the
status of fetuses and concluded that "[Iheft undisturbed, the trial court's ruling would have afforded
preembryos the legal status of 'persons' and vested them with legally cognizable interests separate
from those of their progenitors." Id. at 595.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 595-96. See supra note 174 (considering the holding in York).
179. Id. at 596 (quoting American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERT. & STERIL. 34S-35S (Supp. 1990)).
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developmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic
potential. 180

Following the lead of the American Fertility Society, the court concluded
that early embryos' 81 "are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or
'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life."' 182 The conclusion that
embryos are owed "special respect" projected a third image of the parties
and the case, an image which seemed to share aspects of the trial court's
view of the embryos as children and of the appellate court's suggestion that
the embryos should be seen as commodities.
Indicatively, however, none of the three courts' pronouncements about
the embryos' ontological status provided clear instruction as to the proper
result in the case. Under any of the courts' characterizations of the
embryos, they could have been given to either of the parties, to both of
them, or to neither of them.1 83 Thus, the supreme court's focus on the
embryos' ontological status, and its consideration and rejection of the options
upon which the two lower courts relied, did not guide the court in reaching a
determination about the embryos' fate, but rather established the court's
essential understanding of the drama involving the Davises and the seven
embryos.
More specifically, by declaring expressly that the embryos were to be
given "special respect" and were not to be viewed as commodities, the
supreme court established that its ideological sympathies lay, at least in
significant part, with status, and with the preservation of traditional family
relationships.
The trial court had obviously voiced this position
unambiguously, but that opinion often seemed more parodic' 84 than forceful

180. Id. at 596 (citing and quoting 53 FERT. & STERIL. 34S-35S (see supra note 179)).
181. Newly created embryos are variously labeled embryos, preembryos, fertilized ova,
blastocysts, and zygotes. The different terminological uses often carry moral implications. See
Dolgin, supra note 116, at Section IV.
182. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
183. This point was recognized by George J. Annas after the trial court and appellate court
rendered decisions in the case before the supreme court reached a decision. Annas declared:
For reasons he never explains . . . . the [trial] judge framed the central issue
not as who should get the embryos, but rather whether the embryos were
people or products.
This, of course, is not an outcome-determining
categorization (since either way, the question of who gets them remains).
George J. Annas, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court, HAST. CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989,
at 20, 20.
184. The trial court relied on the testimony of a French geneticist, Dr. Jerome Lejeune, in
concluding that the "seven cryopreserved embryos are human." Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS
641, at *13. The court described Dr. Lejeune's testimony as follows:
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in its support for old-fashioned families. In addition, the opinion of the trial
court allowed for no compromises. The supreme court voiced support for
status and tradition but, despite that support, did not confine its efforts to
determine the embryos' fate within the parameters provided by traditional
understandings of family.
Without any apparent notice of the transparent contradictions between its
recommended theoretical approach and its actual holding, the court in its
determination in Davis-that the embryos be discarded'8-ignored almost
entirely its own insistence on the respect that should be afforded to
cryopreserved embryos.
Indeed, the court's clarification of the embryos' ontological status bore
virtually no relevance to its holding in the case. The decision to allow the
embryos to be destroyed contrasts obviously with the notion that those
embryos were owed "special respect." Moreover, the court announced that
the embryos were owed "special respect," but never explained or examined
the implications of that pronouncement. The court hardly focused on the
embryos at all. Rather, the court decided the case on the basis of the
comparative strength of the rights claimed respectively by Junior and Mary
Sue. In summarizing its deliberations in the case, the court clearly approved
of the use of contracts and contract principles in future cases involving
cryopreserved embryos. Justice Daughtrey wrote for the court:
In summary, we hold that disputes involving the disposition of
preembryos produced by in vitro fertilization should be resolved,
first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their
wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior
agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior
agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using
or not using the preembryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that
the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood
Assuming the embryos are early human beings, Dr. Lejeune offered the
opinion that those early human beings constituted Mrs. Davis' own flesh (and
are also Mr. Davis' flesh) and that the hospitality of her body is the best place
in the world for them to be. He asserted that "the early human beings in the
concentration can . . . are not spare parts. . . .An early human being inside the
suspended time which is the can cannot be the property of anybody because it's
the only one in the world to have the property of building himself. . . . As
soon as he has been conceived, a man is a man."
Id. at *82-83 (Appendix B).
185. The court actually handed control of the embryos back to the Knoxville Fertility Clinic
where the embryos were being stored. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604-05. However, Dr. I. Ray King
of the Knoxville clinic refused to discard or to continue storing the embryos. Eventually, the
embryos were handed over to Junior Davis. For the Record, NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1993, at 8.
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by means other than use of the preembryos in question. If no other
reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using
the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.
However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends
party
merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting
186
prevail.
should
and
interest
greater
the
has
obviously

Thus the court invoked the embryos, and defined them as worthy of
special respect, just as other courts faced with disputes involving custody or
parentage invoke children and their best interests. But, almost immediately,
the court reached a decision that overlooked the embryos, their status, and
the respect due them because of their status, and-not unlike many other
courts handling more routine custody cases-focused on the interests of the
disputing adults.
Perhaps, if questioned, the court would have responded that its decision
respected the embryos by invoking the constitutional rights-rather than the
property interests-of the disputing adults. But, such an explanation is
unconvincing for two reasons. First, the court, which did focus on the
parties' constitutional rights, explained that it would have preferred to focus
on their interests as defined through contract law and that it would have done
so had the parties entered into an appropriate contract.1 87 Second, the
constitutional rights to which the court looked, rights concerning individuals'
intimate relationships such as the right to autonomy in procreation matters,188
are defined explicitly as protection afforded the individual in intimate
relationships and not as rights afforded the family as such.1 89 Thus, the
court's focus on Junior and Mary Sue's respective constitutional rights does
not demonstrate that the court respected the embryos, as its analysis implies
it should have. Rather, within the court's actual analysis, there was no place
for consideration of the embryos, and no respect was paid them.
The Davis court's contradictory positions with regard to the frozen
embryos-its invocation of their special status and then its complete
disregard for them in its holding-is more transparent than similar
contradictions in other cases involving children. The court in Davis, by
detailing its special concern for the embryos, presumed to align itself with
the interests of caring traditional families, with families created through
connections associated with home and love, rather than with connections
186. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
187. Id. at 597-604.
188. Id. at 600-02.
189. See Dolgin, supra note 2 (describing transition from Griswold to Eisenstadt as
transformation from constitutional jurisprudence concerned with family as a unit of status to
constitutional jurisprudence concerned with individuals involved in familial relationships).
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associated with the marketplace. But that concern, however real, was also a
pretext, and one which the court was able to bypass without comment
because, in fact, there were no children to protect. The court's asserted
concern for the embryos served to temper the implications of its actual
ruling, in which it ignored the embryos and considered exclusively the
comparative interests of the gamete donors.
Largely because its contradictions are comparatively clear, Davis
provides an illuminating model through which to consider the implications of
the strategies adopted by other courts deciding custody and parentage
questions. The stark contradiction in Davis between the court's stated view
of the embryos and its treatment of them is reflected, although more
opaquely, in other courts' decisions determining the custody or parentage of
children. And, as in Davis, the apparent concern with children is often
belied in those cases by the treatment paid to children.
190
B. The Best Interests of Children: Baby "M"

Baby "M", probably the best-known surrogacy case in the United States,
involved a dispute over the parentage and custody of a child produced from a
"traditional" M surrogacy agreement. The case arose after Mary Beth
Whitehead, the surrogate, entered into a contract with William Stern, the
biological father.
Whitehead agreed that she would be artificially
inseminated with Stern's sperm, gestate the resulting fetus, and, at the baby's
birth, terminate all parental rights in favor of Stern and his wife,
Elizabeth.' 92
After the birth of the child, however, Whitehead, unwilling to surrender
the baby, fled to Florida.193 Several months later, the child, named Melissa
by William and Betsy Stern, and Sara by Mary Beth Whitehead, was forcibly
190. In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
191. Somewhat startlingly, surrogacy arrangements in which the surrogate bears a genetic and
gestational relation to the child have come to be called "traditional" surrogacy arrangements; the
designation differentiates these arrangements from others in which the surrogate gestates a fetus to
which she has no genetic connection. This second sort of surrogacy is usually called "gestational
surrogacy."
192. In re Baby "M," 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988). The contract, signed by Stern and
Whitehead, was also signed by Whitehead's husband at the time, Richard Whitehead. Whitehead's
participation was necessary in order for him to deny paternity of a child conceived by his wife
during the marriage. Elizabeth Stern did not enter into the contract in order to avoid violating state
rules against purchasing a child. Id. The contract entered into among the parties can be found at

537 A.2d at 1265-73.
193.

In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d at 1146.
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returned to the Sterns as the result of a court order.194 At trial, the validity
of the contract entered into among195the parties, as well as the parentage and
custody of the baby, were at issue.
This case, unlike those involving more complicated reproductive
technology, disrupted familiar social understandings of maternity and
paternity, but did not disrupt established biological understandings. The
attempt to create a parent-child bond in contractual terms proved troubling,
but did not challenge traditional notions about biological reproduction. The
only technology involved was that employed to accomplish the artificial
insemination of Whitehead with Stern's sperm. 196 In fact, none of the parties
questioned Mary Beth Whitehead's maternity, or William Stern's paternity,
as a biological matter.
Thus, in this case, more than in others' 97 that challenge understandings of
biological reproduction as well as expectations about the social dimensions of
family, the law attempted to rely, at least in large part, on concepts
embedded firmly within family law. Judge Sorkow, who presided in the trial
court, upheld the surrogacy contract but defined the case to depend primarily
on the best interests of the child.198 The court seemed to uphold the contract
largely as an expedient to establish the Sterns' parentage.
The judge, compelled to rely on the contract to terminate Whitehead's
maternal rights and thereby facilitate the adoption of the child by Betsy
Stern, 199 favored an old-fashioned vision of family life. 200 He attempted to
mitigate the implications of his clear reliance on contract in establishing the
child's parentage by defining the contract as secondary to the court's
decision. Judge Sorkow declared: "The primary issue to be determined by

194. Id.
195. Id. at 1156-72.
196. Artificial insemination has been available for over a century.

WILFRED J. FINEGOLD,

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 3-6 (2d ed. 1976); see also CARMEL SHALEV,

BIRTH POWER:

THE

CASE FOR SURROGACY 59 (1989) (asserting that first use of artificial insemination for human
reproduction was in the late eighteenth century). Nothing more than a turkey baster is needed to
perform an insemination. The procedure can be, though in the Whitehead-Stern case was not,
performed at home by non-medical people. Id. at 58.
197. See infra notes 235-78 and accompanying text (analyzing response of case law to dispute
occasioned by gestational surrogacy).
198. 525 A.2d at 1132.
199. New Jersey law provided for the involuntary termination of parental rights only upon a
finding of parental unfitness. Moreover, under state adoption law, no child could be made available
for adoption until that child's biological parents' rights had been terminated, either voluntarily or
involuntarily. See Janet L. Dolgin, Family Law and the Facts of Family, in NATURALIZING POWER
47, 56-57 (Sylvia Yanagisako & Carol Delaney eds., 1995).
200. See Dolgin, supra note 19, at 536-39 (analyzing Judge Sorkow's vision of family
presented in the case).
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this litigation is what are the best interests of a child until now called 'Baby
M.' All other concerns raised by counsel constitute commentary." 21' Those
"concerns" clearly included the court's extensive analysis, and apparent
validation, of the surrogacy contract.20 2
The trial court concluded that the child's best interests in fact reflected the
terms of the contract, and as a result of the contractual and best-interest
analyses combined, established the Sterns' parentage. 20 3 The court's reliance
on the child's best interests to determine parentage, not custody, was itself
unusual, but not unprecedented, °4 and would probably have been impossible
under existing New Jersey statutory law, had the court been unwilling to rely
on the contract as well as on its analysis of the child's best interests. For the
trial court, the validation of the contract became a sort of technical necessity
for providing the child with a stable, loving home. But, in fact, the court's
reliance on the contract was essential to its holding, and so a contradiction
between the correlates of tradition and the correlates of modernity sits at the
center of the court's decision.
The trial court granted full custody to William Stern, terminated Mary
Beth Whitehead's parental rights, and ordered the adoption of the child by
Betsy Stern. 205 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in almost complete
contrast, invalidated the surrogacy contract, found the payment of money to
a surrogate "illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to
women," ' 2 0 6 and voided both the termination of Mary Beth Whitehead's
parental rights and the adoption of the baby by Elizabeth Stern. The
the child's
supreme court left custody with Stern, but in declaring Whitehead
20 7
child.
the
with
association
continued
her
for
provided
mother,
Judicial opinions more clearly at odds are hard to imagine. Yet, behind
the differences in the two courts' holdings is a similar outlook, represented
by a shared vision of the family as a universe of enduring, loving
relationships. 208 That vision is suggested most vividly by the reliance placed
by each court on the best interests of Baby M. Despite the differing
conclusions of the two courts about the contract and about the scope of Baby
201. In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d at 1132.
202. Id.at 1156-72.
203. Id.at 1171.
204. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 799 n.4 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (noting provision in California statute for deciding parentage on basis of best-interest
analysis).
205. In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d at 1175.
206. In re Baby "M", 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
207. Id. at 1234-35.
208. See Dolgin, supra note 19, at 535-45 (analyzing ideological similarities in positions of
courts and parties in Baby "M" case).
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M's family, each court justified its conclusions with reference to the child's
interests.209 The
trial court explicitly delineated those interests as the
"primary issue" 210 in the case. 2 11 The court heard twenty-three witnesses, at
least eleven of whom were experts testifying about the child's interests 2 2 and
devoted almost half of its lengthy opinion to considering
• 213 the child's interests.
The state supreme court, despite a mild disclaimer,
handled the case as
courts typically handle custody disputes between divorcing parents
and, in
2 4
1
interests.
best
M's
Baby
to
references
of
dozens
made
that,
doing
However, despite each court's apparently well-intentioned effort to
protect the child, the results for the child are far less certain than the two
courts' stated aims and suggest that each court's reliance on the best interest
standard also served ends unrelated to the specific child and her welfare.
The trial court's focus on Baby M's interests contrasted with its reliance on
the presumptions of contract in establishing Baby M's parentage and served
to mitigate the implications of creating a parent-child bond on the basis of a
contract.
The trial court seriously entertained the child's best interests. However,
perhaps without full consciousness, it also used that analysis to deflect the
implications that follow inevitably from its validation of the surrogacy
agreement-especially the implication that traditional families can be
successfully created through the use of money, bargain, and choice-that
people in families created through contract can live out relationships as
traditional as any.
The best-interest analysis of the state supreme court is more telling still.
The supreme court proclaimed again and again that the child's best interests
were to be determinative, but gave relatively little attention to concrete
consideration of those interests. On initial examination, that might be
excused in light of the trial court's extensive best-interest analysis, and the
supreme court's stated respect for that analysis. 215 However, the trial court's
best-interest analysis assumed that, were the Sterns found to be good parents,
they would be the legal parents and sole custodians of the child. The trial
209. 525 A.2d at 1176; 537 A.2d at1234.
210. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text (considering significance of court's
validation of surrogacy contract in light of its interest in preservation of old-fashioned family).
211. 525A.2dat 1132.
212. 537 A.2d at 1237.
213. Id.at 1263 (noting case was "not a divorce case").
214. See, e.g., id.at 1234, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1246, 1252, 1256, 1257,
1258, 1259, 1260, 1262.
215. Id. at 1238. Judge Wilentz, writing for the higher court, described the trial court's
analysis of the child's interests as "perceptive, demonstrating both [the trial court's] understanding
of the case and its considerable experience in these matters." Id.
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court, in granting custody to William and Betsy Stern, had already
concluded, as a result of its analysis of the surrogacy contract, that it was
prepared to terminate Whitehead's parental rights absolutely.
The supreme court, in contrast, recognized William Stern and Mary Beth
Whitehead as the child's biological and legal parents, thereby giving each of
them, if not found unfit, the right to continued association with the child.
Thus, inevitably, the essential consequence of the supreme court's, but not of
the trial court's, opinion was the creation of a "family" quite unlike families
reconstructed following divorce or following the separation of unmarried
parents.
Whitehead and Stern intended quite certainly to produce a child together.
Yet they had never lived together or had sexual relations together; they had
never intended to share a life together, and had not intended, and never
desired, to share the parental role. Were the interests of the child to have
been seriously entertained in this case, these facts would have been at the
center of the judicial inquiry.
The court ignored the real choices that followed from its invalidation of
the surrogacy contract and instead defined the issue to be resolved by its
best-interest analysis as a simple choice between "life . . .for Baby M . . .
with primary custody in the Whiteheads or one with primary custody in the
Sterns."216 In making that choice, the court gave custody to William Stern
and remanded the case for a determination of the details of Whitehead's
visitation right. The remanding
mandated 2 1 7 that some sort of visitation be
218
Whitehead.
to
provided
In reaching its conclusions, the court failed completely to consider the
possibility that its basic determination-that Stern remain the child's father
and Whitehead her mother-might not serve the interests of the child. To
some extent, the court understood state statutory law as giving it no
alternative in this regard. However, the court did not relate the relevance of
that fact to its best-interest analysis, and, more importantly, did not instruct
the trial court on remand to consider the particular and unique aspects of the
dispute in determining the details of Whitehead's visitation right.
In fact, the court remarked, although almost incidentally, that the case
was unlike most custody disputes following divorce, and resembled other
216. In re Baby "M", 537 A.2d 1227, 1257 (N.J. 1988) (alteration in original).
217. The supreme court expressly ordered that Judge Sorkow, who had presided in the trial
court, be precluded from considering the visitation issue on remand. The supreme court found that
his previous involvement in the case might render him unable to reach a just resolution of the
visitation question. Id. at 1261 n.19.
218. Id. at 1263. The court "decided that Mrs. Whitehead is entitled to visitation at some
point, and that question is not open to the trial court on this remand." Id.
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cases in which "the non-custodial spouse has had practically no relationship
with the child.,219 By implication, the child's best interests would not likely
be served by assuming the facts of a custody dispute. But that, of course, is
just what the state supreme court did, and so the court had to justify its
approach. In doing so, the court referred to Whitehead's early custody of
Baby M, especially the four-month period in which she lived with the child
in Florida after having evaded the Sterns and state law 22 with the baby. Far
more telling, the court dismissed as inconsequential the implications of the
dispute's unique history by asserting the right of the biological mother,
rather than the interests of the child. The court explained:
[Mrs. Whitehead] is not only the natural mother, but also the legal
mother, and is not to be penalized one iota because of the
surrogacy contract. Mrs. Whitehead, as the mother (indeed, as a
mother who nurtured her child for its first four monthsunquestionably a relevant consideration), is entitled to have her
own interest in visitation considered.
Visitation cannot be
determined without
considering
the
parents'
interests along with
221
those of the child.
Thus, at this crucial moment in its analysis of the case, the court
substituted the interests of the mother for those of the child and therefore,
despite its apparent focus on the child's best interests, made it impossible to
decipher the actual interests of that child. That task would have required
analysis of the consequences for the child of moving between two
significantly different homes, between three parents and two mothers
originally joined together as contract partners, and between parents whose
intense animosity toward each other was expressly a consequence of the
child's birth. Those determinative facts are unique to Baby M and should
have been central to the court's consideration of the child's interests.
On remand, the trial court was directed to decide the terms, but not the
fact, of Whitehead's right to visit the child. In response, the trial court
provided for "unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation" between the

219. Id.
220. Immediately after her birth, Baby M went home with the Sterns. Soon thereafter,
however, the Sterns agreed to let Whitehead bring the baby home with her for a short time. When
Whitehead did not return the baby to the Sterns, William Stern filed a complaint seeking
enforcement of the surrogacy contract. As a result, an ex parte order was issued ordering that
Whitehead return the baby to Stern. The Whiteheads fled with the baby to Florida when the process
server and police attempted to execute the court's order. Id. at 1236-37.
221. Id. at 1263.
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222

mother and child.
That determination, of course, was based on the
assumption, which followed from the supreme court's direction, that
Whitehead was entitled to visitation, and the supreme court's suggestion that
such visitation not be delayed.2 23
Some of the complications that follow, even in theory, from the supreme
court's best-interest determination were vividly suggested in a 1994 story in
Redbook magazine224 that featured Baby M and her family. The story
included small, familiar pictures of Baby M, the Sterns, and Mary Beth
Whitehead taken at the time of trial and other, larger pictures showing sevenyear-old Baby M, at the beach, in the park, and at home 225 with Mary Beth
Whitehead (now known as Mary Gould) and her other four children. At the
time, Whitehead's immediate family featured in the story included her two
children with Richard Whitehead, whom she divorced before the Baby M
litigation ended, and two younger children, born to Whitehead before and
during a subsequent marriage to her second husband, Richard Gould.
The story did not include pictures of the child with the Sterns, who were
not interviewed by the magazine, and who apparently played no part in the
preparation of the story. 226
However, the contrast, especially in
Whitehead S227 view, between her home and that of the Sterns, is central.
Whitehead compared her own health with what "her spies" in the Stern's
community described as Betsy Stern's worsening physical state as a result of
multiple sclerosis. 228 She angrily contrasted the eating, conversational, and

222. In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988). The court provided for
increasing visitation rights, beginning with one day a week and increasing within a few months to
include two days every other week and within a year to include weekly overnight visits and
significant holiday visitation. Id. at 55.
223. The supreme court asserted that delaying Whitehead's visitation with the child for five
years, as the guardian ad litem in the case had suggested, "begins to border on termination." 537
A.2d at 1263. The court also directed the trial court, on remand, to "recall the touchstones of
visitation: that it is desirable for the child to have contact with both parents; that besides the child's
interests, the parents' interests also must be considered; but that when all is said and done, the best
interests of the child are paramount." Id.
224. Susan Squire, Whatever Happened to Baby M?, REDBOOK, Jan. 1994, at 60.
225. The house actually pictured in the story was not that of Whitehead, but her parents' home
in Florida. Whitehead, her other four children, and Baby M (known as "Sassy") were visiting with
Whitehead's parents at the time of the interview.
226. The Redbook story was subtitled, "An Exclusive Interview with America's Most Famous
Surrogate Mother About the Daughter She Fought So Hard to Keep, But Couldn't." Squire, supra
note 224, at 60.
227. Mary Beth Whitehead now uses that name when appearing publicly, often in support of
other surrogate mothers. Id. at 63.
228. The Sterns' original decision to conceive a child through surrogacy was attributed to
Betsy Stern's fear that a mild case of multiple sclerosis from which she suffered could be seriously
exacerbated as the result of a pregnancy. 537 A.2d at 1235.

28:473]

NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

recreational patterns in the two homes, finding the Sterns seriously wanting.
And she complained about the child following the "frumpy, old" model set
by Betsy Stern.2 29
Parts of the story seem to resemble consequences common after an
unfriendly divorce, but in Baby M's case her mother's antagonism is
directed at a second mother, even more than at a father. And, far more
consequentially, the child here knows clearly, and apparently hears
frequently, at least from Whitehead, 230 that her birth brought and continues
to bring great sadness to her parents.
Whitehead's mother, Eileen
Messer,
told the Redbook reporter, out of Whitehead's hearing:
"This
2 32
whole business has destroyed our family, and it's changed her."
If the supreme court had affirmed the lower court's holding and
sanctioned the termination of Whitehead's maternity or granted maternity
and full custody to Whitehead, similarly discordant consequences might have
followed. The aim here is not to determine the child's best interests in light
of the situation of her birth to a surrogate mother and the subsequent dispute
between that surrogate and the biological father and his wife. Rather, it is to
suggest how remiss the supreme court was for requiring that the child's best
interests be determined anew in light of the supreme court's recognition of
Stern as the child's father and of Whitehead as her mother.
After the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that the child's best
interests, not parental choice, should be determinative, the court proceeded
as if the adult participants had not made the choices they had already made,
choices responsible for creating the situation that did exist. The court, in
determining the child's interests, failed almost completely to recognize that
best interests are actualized, or are not actualized, in concrete settings and in
particular relationships.
For the trial court and the supreme court that rendered decisions in Baby
M, the best-interest analysis on which each court seemed so securely to rely
served interests beyond those of the particular child. For each court, the
best-interest analysis served to endorse a particular vision of family. That
vision, similar for both courts and predicated on the centrality of children
and the parent-child bond, became particularly crucial to each court in
229. Squire, supra note 224, at 64.
230. Id. The fact that a popular magazine, sold in supermarkets and other well-frequented
places, has starred Baby M in one of its issues makes it even more likely that the child will be
continually exposed to recognition of the pain her birth has brought all her parents.
231. During the trial to determine Baby M's parentage and custody, Eileen Messer, together
with her husband Joseph Messer, petitioned the court for grandparental visitation rights. In re Baby
"M", 525 A.2d 1128, 1172-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
232. Squire, supra note 224, at 102.
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mitigating the discordant implication, present in each decision, that family
relationships could be established in contractual terms. 33
These decisions, taken together, illustrate how the judiciary's invocation
of children, generally, and reliance on the best-interest standard,
particularly, further the illusion that the law and society favor, and can
ensure the survival of, traditional families even as the law provides for the
construction of family relationships in the terms of the marketplace.
Similarly, the decisions illustrate how easily the interests of children can be
overlooked in such cases unless the contours and social implications of
families created through non-traditional arrangements are acknowledged and
carefully considered.
C. Biological, Legal, and Intending Parents: Johnson v. Calvert
234

Even more than Baby M, Johnson v. Calvert,
the product of a
gestational surrogacy agreement, defies the easy application of traditional
approaches to disputes about parentage and custody. Johnson arose as the
result of an agreement by which Anna Johnson would gestate and give birth
to a child produced from the gametes of Crispina Calvert and her husband,
Mark Calvert. 35 In exchange, and for her commitment to surrender all
parental rights to the Calverts at the baby's birth, Johnson was to be paid
$10,000 in a series of installments. In January 1990 a zygote produced from
the Calverts' gametes was inserted in Anna's uterus. A pregnancy followed.
Before the birth of the baby-a boy, named Christopher-the parties were in
court disputing the child's parentage.23 6
The case posed a dramatic challenge to the law's ability to sort out the
strands of legal parentage when the social and biological implications of the

233. The trial court validated the surrogacy contract and thus provided for the termination of
Whitehead's parental rights and for the adoption of the child by Betsy Stern. Baby "M", 525 A.2d
at 1175-76. The state supreme court also allowed for the possibility that families might be
constructed in contractual terms when it recognized that "the legislature remains free to deal with
this most sensitive issue as it sees fit, subject only to constitutional constraints." In re Baby "M",
537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988).
234. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-633190, slip op. at 5 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 22,
1990), aff'd sub nom. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), superseded by
822 P.2d 1317 (Cal. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 206, and cert. dismissed sub nom. Baby Boy J. v. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993).
235. Johnson, No. X-633190, slip op. at 5.
236. See Dolgin, supra note 153, at 684-89 (analyzing lower court opinions in Johnson); Janet
L. Dolgin, The 'Intent' of Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies and the Parent-ChildBond, 26
CONN. L. REV. 1261, 1279-95 (1994) [hereinafter 'Intent' of Reproduction] (analyzing implications
of the California Supreme Court's reliance on intent in Johnson).
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child's birth were both murky. 237 All three levels of the California court
system determined that the Calverts were the baby's parents.238 But the
reasoning behind each court's holding differed completely from that of the
other two courts. Each court at least noted the child and his welfare and
declared that its holding served his advantage. Yet, none of the three courts
focused directly on those interests. 239
The three cases, taken as a set, illustrate how severely the disruptions
posed by reproductive technology test traditional responses to parentage and
custody issues. More specifically, differences in understandings of what
constitutes "natural" parentage and custody between the state supreme
court's majority and dissenting opinions suggest new levels of confusion
about the essence of the parent-child bond.

1. Three Courts' Decisions
The trial court, describing Johnson as a "gestational carrier," but a
"genetic hereditary stranger[]"
to the child, identified the baby's family on
a basis of "shared genes" among Christopher and the Calverts. This court
grounded its decision on the understanding that the parent-child bond, at
least from a biological perspective, is a genetic bond.
The court
'
24 1
acknowledged the likelihood of an "attachment"
between a woman
gestating a fetus and the baby to which she gives birth, but rejected the
suggestion that the gestational role leads to "emotional bonding" suggestive
of biological maternity. 242
Although the court expressed no conclusions about the welfare of the
child involved in the case, the opinion contained a number of references to
children and to the best interests of children in general. For instance, the

237. See Dolgin, supra note 116 (analyzing complications arising from simultaneous challenge
to social and biological correlates of family).
238. The racial and class aspects of this case, though not discussed by the courts, were likely
relevant to their conclusions. Anna Johnson, a black, unmarried mother of a three-year-old and a
sometime-welfare recipient, worked as a vocational nurse in the same hospital in which Crispina
Calvert, a Filipina, was employed as a registered nurse.
Karen H. Rothenberg, Gestational
Surrogacy and the Health Care Provider: Put Part of the "IVF Genie" Back into the Bottle, 18 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 345, 345 (1990). Crispina's husband, Mark, was white and an insurance
salesman. Katha Pollitt, When Is a Mother Not a Mother?, 251 NATION 825, 842 (1990).
239. The dissent in the California Supreme Court suggested that the baby's interests be
determinative in establishing his parentage but provided no guidance for the determination of those
interests. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 797-800 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
240. Johnson, No. X-633190, slip op. at 5.
241. Id. at 9.
242. Id.
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court rejected the suggestion that it find "three natural parents." That
suggestion, asserted the court, "is really not in the best interests of the child,
and that's true I think in any in vitro fertilization case." 243 The court
elaborated:
Dr. Call [an expert witness] testified that with regard to having
three natural parents or two natural mothers, you can have
problems raising a child in this situation. We are talking about
starting out in infancy, identity problems, confusion, conflicts
between
how a child is going to be raised, and this is confusing to a
244
child.
Later, the trial court judge, Judge Parslow, was even more explicit about
justifying the court's determination that the genetic parents, not the
gestational mother, were the biological and legal parents, through reference
to the child's welfare. Judge Parslow asserted that "in an increasingly antichild, I'm for me first society, I think the decision I'm making in this case is
definitely pro child."245 In explaining that assertion, however, the judge
concluded by referring not to the interests of the child but to those of the
Calverts. The child, declared the court, "should be raised exclusively by the
Calverts as natural parents. They 2shouldn't
have to spend the next 18 years
46
waiting for the other shoe to drop."
In short, the trial court decided the case based on its understanding of the
biological correlates of kinship. On this ground, in Judge Parslow's view,
genetics, not gestation, constitutes the maternal connection. In anchoring the
court's holding in a biological, rather than a sociological, reality, the judge
assumed, without any apparent examination of the question, that this
approach would best serve the child's interests.
247
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision.
Declaring its concern with avoiding public policy considerations, 248 the court
based its decision on the genetic relation between the Calverts and the child,
but unlike the trial court, the higher court reached that decision as a result of
its reading of statutory law, rather than its understanding of the biological
reality. The court relied on sections of the Uniform Parentage Act, enacted

243. Id.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991).

248. Id. at 382. "Our system of government," the court declared, "does not make the courts
de facto 'philosopher-kings."' Id. (footnote omitted).
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in California in 1975, which defined a child's
mother as the woman
249
identifiable through blood-genetic marker tests.
However, the court dismissed other sections of the same statute which
allowed the mother-child relation to be established on the basis of a woman's
having given birth to a child. 250 The court determined that because the
legislature had asserted that the mother-child relation may be established
through proof of a woman's having given birth to a child, it was legitimate to
ignore the provision and declare the egg donor the mother. However, as the
court clearly knew, the Uniform Parentage Act was written and promulgated
in California before embryo transfer and gestational surrogacy were
possible. At that time, the legislators assumed that the woman who gave
birth to a child was necessarily the child's genetic mother.
The court of appeal, seemingly anxious to rely on legislative direction at
almost any cost to avoid independent consideration of the implications of
gestational surrogacy, 251 had no need to justify its holding through invocation
of children and their welfare, or in any other way, because it presented that
holding as compelled by statutory law. The court, certainly aware that,
whatever its decision, an appeal would likely follow, refrained almost
completely from justifying its decision by references to children's welfare or
to any other public policy concerns. The court, by relying on contemporary
statutory provisions about parentage, framed the inapplicability of those
statutes to cases such as Johnson and, therefore, indicated the extent to
which the law flounders in interpreting and resolving disruptions engendered
by reproductive technology.
The California Supreme Court, re-affirming the decision to name the
Calverts as the baby's parents, recognized that neither biology nor statutory
law provided direction in resolving the dispute. Each could be read to prefer
Crispina Calvert or Anna Johnson as the baby's mother. 252 The court
249. Id. at 373-75. The court rejected another statutory provision under which a woman who
gives birth to a child "may be established" as the child's mother. Id. at 377. The court stressed the
legislature's use of the word "may" in this provision and asserted that "[tihe statute is silent on
whether the woman who gives birth is automatically the 'natural mother."' Id.
250. Id.
251. The court concluded its decision with a plea for further legislative guidance. Id. at 38182. The court wrote:
Thorny questions about the rights of a "gestational surrogate," remedies in
the event of breach of a surrogacy agreement, terms of payment and
termination of pregnancy cry out for legislative guidelines. To the extent these
issues present questions of law, they are matters for legislative resolution
subject to constitutional restraint. They should not be settled by the judiciary
applying its own ideas of what is good "public policy."
Id. at 382.
252. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993).
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constructed an alternative approach that relied on "the parties' intentions as
manifested in the surrogacy agreement." 253 The court explained:
[A]ithough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and
giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman,
she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended
to raise as her
254
law.
California
under
mother
natural
the
own-is
By relying on intention as the determinant of parentage, the court
approached the case in terms resembling the world of contract far more
closely than the world of traditional family. Intent implies choice and
negotiation, and suggests bargained interactions rather than enduring
commitments, understood as grounded in the inexorable facts of human
reproduction.
Yet, in a remarkable twist, the court reconstructed the meaning of intent
so that it reflected the world of the marketplace as well as that of oldfashioned families. 255
The opinion is remarkable for transparently
determining parenthood in contractual terms while connecting those terms
with the central prerogatives of family relationships understood in traditional
terms. For instance, the court suggested that "the mental concept of the
child," because essential to its creation, establishes a special relation between
the people conceiving of the child and the child: "'the originators of that
concept merit full credit as conceivers. ' 256 Thus, the intending parents
resemble biological parents in having conceived the child in a unique,
determinative act. Moreover, the court determined that "the interests of
children, particularly at the outset of their lives, are '[un]likely to run
contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into being."25

253. Id. at 782.
254. Id.
255. See 'Intent' of Reproduction, supra note 236, at 279-95 (analyzing the California
Supreme Court's use and understanding of "intent" as the determinant of parenthood in Johnson).
256. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting and citing Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining
Mother: A Legal Matrixfor New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196 (1986)).
257. Id. at 783 (quoting and citing Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and IntentBased Parenthood: An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 WiS. L. REV. 297, 397).
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2. Should Parentage be Founded on 'Intent' or on Best Interests?
Justice Kennard, in dissent, declared that, in the absence of appropriate
legislation, 258 parentage disputes engendered by gestational surrogacy
arrangements should be resolved through examination of the best interests of
the child involved. 259 Justice Kennard, although viewing the majority's
reliance on intent as worthy of serious consideration, rejected that approach
largely because the contractual premises on which
it relied suggest that
260
children can, and should be, treated as property.
In contrast, Justice Kennard proposed that the case be remanded to the
trial court for examination of the best interests of the child, and that the
parents be determined as a result of that examination. Like the majority,
Justice Kennard suggested that the approach she recommended could be used
to determine the child's "natural," not just legal, parents (and in particular,
his "natural," not just legal, mother) under California law. 26
Justice
Kennard's approach was aimed clearly at establishing parentage, not
custody, and as a result, resembles that of the majority in grounding
parentage exclusively on cultural, rather than natural, parameters.2 62 The
determinant selected by Justice Kennard-the best interests of the child-like
the determinant selected by the majority-parental intent-grounds "natural"
parentage on examination, analysis, and choice, and does not anchor
consequential decisions about parentage in even the illusion of inexorable
truth.
Thus, both the majority and the dissent, faced in Johnson with a dispute
whose dimensions dramatically challenge traditional notions of parentage,
opted to forego an appeal to biological fact, 2 6 3 traditionally the exclusive
determinant of "natural" parentage, and sought instead a definition of
"natural" parentage as a matter of culture and law. Furthermore, in doing
258. Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that the Uniform Parentage Act did not direct
any choice between a genetic and a gestational mother. Id. at 794-95 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 789 (Kennard, I.,dissenting).
260. Id. at 796-97 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 798-99 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the child's interest might be
best "served by recognizing Crispina as the natural mother").
262. Id. at 799 (Kennard, J. dissenting). Justice Kennard justified this approach under existing
California law by noting that the Uniform Parentage Act, promulgated in California, already
allowed courts to consider a child's best interests in determining certain matters of parentage. Id.
263. Both the majority, 851 P.2d at 782, and the dissent, id. at 795, asserted that an appeal to
biological fact was precluded by the Uniform Parentage Act, which provided for a finding that
either the genetic or the gestational mother was the child's "natural" mother. In fact, of course, the
court could have bypassed that statute on the ground that it was promulgated about a decade before a
gestational surrogate was even possible and should, therefore, not be applicable to resolving disputes
caused by the disintegration of gestational surrogacy arrangements.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

this, the court's majority and Justice Kennard's dissent each connected their
select determinant to traditional conceptions of family. For the court, which
relied on the notion of intent, the task of establishing this connection
required that the notion of intent be reconstructed to reflect a world of love
and enduring connection as well as a world of choice and bargained
negotiation. For the dissent, selection of the best-interest test as the
determinant of natural parentage harmonized immediately with traditional
notions of families.
Despite this important similarity, however, the two approaches differ
significantly. The majority preserved a traditional model of family that
presumes that parentage follows inevitably from the facts of the case, but
substituted intent (and the world of contract implied therein) for biology as
the central operating principle through which claims to parentage can be
settled. The dissent, in contrast, relied on a principle taken directly from
family law (the best-interest standard) but applied it so as to construct a new
model of parentage. In this model, a child's interests do not follow from,
but rather establish, "natural" parentage. 264 Thus, the dissent and the
majority debated the respective merits of the determinants selected as those
that would likely affect the interests of children.
The majority argued that the dissent had confused notions of parentage
and custody, while the majority's resolution of the dispute allowed for
continued understandings of parentage as the inevitable-if no longer
necessarily natural-consequence of plain facts. The majority asserted:
The dissent would decide parentage based on the best interests of
the child. Such an approach raises the repugnant specter of
governmental interference in matters implicating our most
fundamental notions of privacy, and confuses concepts of parentage
and custody. Logically, the determination of parentage must
precede, and should not be dictated by, eventual custody decisions.
The implicit assumption of the dissent is that a recognition of the
genetic intending mother as the natural mother may sometimes
This assumption overlooks California's
harm the child.
dependency laws, which are designed to protect all children
irrespective of the manner of birth or conception. Moreover, the
best interest standard poorly serves the child in the present
situation: it fosters instability during litigation and, if applied to
recognize the gestator as natural mother, results in a split of

264. As the dissent noted, its procedure for determining the child's natural parents was not
unpredecented but does challenge society's general understanding of "natural" parentage. Id. at 799
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
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custody between the natural
father and the gestator, an outcome not
265
child.
the
benefit
to
likely

Thus, in the court's view, the application of a best-interest test must, as has
traditionally been the case, follow determinations of parentage. This view
rests on the connected assumptions that children are best served by some
guarantee of "natural" parentage apart from the fitness or comparative
fitness of those parents, and that the best-interest standard cannot (or should
not) be used to establish "natural" fact. The dissent, in short, is said to have
proposed relying on the standard potentially to upset, rather than to affirm,
the basic order of things-an order that inexorably provides "natural"
parents for each child, apart from considerations of those parents' abilities to
serve in the parental role. The claim, of course, as the dissent recognized at
least in part, 266 is peculiar, given the majority's own recommendation that
parentage be established through reliance on a standard (parental intent) far
less often connected to the regulation of family matters than is the bestinterest standard.
The majority blurred the contradiction between its own reliance on intent
and traditional understandings of family by reconstructing the notion of
intent to conform with, and suggest, those more traditional understandings.
Ultimately, however, the contradictions underlying the majority's position
cannot be so easily mediated. The majority redefined intent so convincingly
for itself that it distinguished its own approach from that of the dissent by
equating its approach, but not the dissent's, with traditional understandings
of family as a social unit embedded in inexorable truth. The contradiction
between the majority's actual reliance on the concept of intent and its
characterization of its approach as traditional illustrates as starkly as any
aspect of this complicated case the inability of society, including its courts of
law, to interpret sensibly, and to adjust easily to, changes in the creation and
operation of the family.
The dissent, in turn, expressly asserted that its best-interest proposal for
setting parentage involved no confusion between parentage and custody.26 7
But that is so only if parentage is not measured against models traditionally
265. Id. at 782 n.10.
266. See id. at 798-99 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent did not explicitly acknowledge
that the majority's proposal and its own were similarly grounded in the substitution of social choices
for biological truths in establishing family relationships. However, Justice Kennard criticized the
majority for establishing parentage through reliance on a concept more appropriate to the world of
the marketplace than to the home.
267. The dissent referred to a provision in California statutory law that provided for a
determination of parentage on the basis of a best-interest analysis. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799 (citing
§ 7017(d)(2) of the Uniform Parentage Act, as promulgated in California).

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

used for identifying the parent-child bond. Those traditional models assume
parentage, as a matter of "natural" fact, to follow inexorably from biological
connections. So, while the dissent criticized the majority for having created
an "inflexible rule" for establishing parentage, the rule embodied in
traditional understandings of parentage is similarly inflexible.
However, in another criticism of the majority, the dissent tied its position
more firmly to tradition than the position of the majority. The dissent
ultimately rejected the majority's reliance on intent because the concept .of
intent is "grounded in principles of tort, intellectual property and commercial
contract law.''268 Family law, not commercial law, the dissent argued,
269
should govern the regulation of family matters.
Yet, despite its apparent
connection to traditional family law principles, the resolution that the dissent
would have affected unsettles traditional assumptions about parentage as
decisively as the majority's reliance on the notion of intent.
Although the majority and the dissent depart significantly from traditional
understandings of family and parentage, the two opinions focus on a longstanding, central assumption about parentage in general, and in particular,
about application of the best-interest standard. This assumption-reflected in
the majority's decision, but in a new form, and questioned directly in the
dissent's decision-directs courts to conclude that parents almost always
serve their children's interests in the nature of the case-that parents
"naturally" care, and provide, for their children.
The assumption
encouraged courts applying the best-interest standard to focus on, and serve,
the interests of parents as well as of children.
The assumption was made startlingly clear more than a decade before
Johnson, in Parham v. J.R.270 In that case, the United States Supreme Court
validated a Georgia statute that provided for the commitment of children to
mental institutions upon application by a parent or guardian and
authorization by the superintendent of the hospital. 27 The Court justified its
holding through reference to "natural bonds" that guide parents to act in
their children's best interests. The Court wrote:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has been recognized that natural bonds of

268.
269.
270.
271.

851 P.2d at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Id.
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
See generally id.
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affection 27lead
parents to act in the best interests of their
2
children.

More specifically, the assumption expressed in Parham-that parents
naturally act to serve their children's interests-generally informs courts
applying the best-interest standard, and even more often precludes the need
for application of the standard altogether. The assumption obviously does
not help courts select between two fit parents as are often found in divorce
cases involving custody disputes, butrit has routinely
d" 273served the interests of
parents, in disputes against other potential custodians.
The assumption that parents serve their children's interests because they
are parents is reflected in Johnson in the majority's express claim that
parents-here established through intent rather than through biological
connections-will serve their children well because the interests of children
likely will not "run contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into
being."274 Thus, after defining the Calverts as "natural" parents, the court
concluded that, as such, the Calverts would be "good" parents.
Moreover, in considering Johnson's claims to maternity, the court
concluded that the very act that defined Johnson as a non-parent-her initial
denial of parental intent-demonstrated her lack of fitness to be a mother.
"[B]y voluntarily contracting away any rights to the child," wrote the court,
"[Johnson] has, in effect, conceded the best interest of the child is not with
her."275 Thus, the majority assumed a best-interest analysis as part of its
reconstruction of parentage through reliance on the notion of intent. So
formulated, the approach to family that underlies the best-interest standard
will result almost invariably in courts deciphering the best interests of
children by focusing on the interests and rights of their (competing) parents.
That tendency, which defined earlier cases involving disputes over custody
or parentage, becomes even clearer amidst the peculiar complexities of cases
occasioned by reproductive technology.
In contrast, the dissent reversed traditional assumptions about parentage
and best interests, and proposed that parentage should flow from, as well as
assure, a child's interests. It cannot, of course, be known how that
suggestion would have been applied had the dissent's view been accepted by
a majority of the court. Were the dissent's proposal to be applied in an

272. Id. at 602 (citations omitted).
273. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 282-83 (N.Y. 1976) (allowing judicial inquiry into
whether interests of child would be served by placement of child with foster parents rather than
biological mother but restricting such inquiry to cases involving "extraordinary circumstances").
274. 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Shultz, supra note 257, at 397).
275. Id. at 782 n.10.
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actual gestational surrogacy case, the difficulties encountered by the New
Jersey courts in Baby M 2 7 6 would be magnified by the possibility that two
biological mothers and three biological parents might logically be
recognized. Justice Kennard followed familiar judicial considerations in
suggesting that in such a case, a reviewing court should focus on the adults'
"ability to nurture the child physically and psychologically . . . and to
provide ethical and intellectual guidance. Also crucial to a child's best
interests... is,,,277
the 'well recognized right' of every child 'to stability and
continuity.
This guidance provides almost no concrete assistance to a
trial court asked to establish the best interests of a child such as Christopher.
In the end, neither the majority nor the dissent in Johnson paid any real
heed to the interests of the child. The majority precluded the need to
examine the child's interests by presuming expressly that, in the nature of the
case, intending parents will serve their children well. The dissent, proposing
that the child's best interests determine its parentage, left future courts
without a clue about how to accomplish that task.
In this case, complicated beyond ordinary custody and parentage disputes
by the simultaneous and novel challenge presented to the biological and
278
social correlates of parenthood, all the justices of the state supreme court
agreed about one thing. Both the decision of the majority and that of the
dissent unsettle traditional understandings about family by substituting choice
for inexorable truth as the determinant of parentage. Yet, both justified that
substitution by an appeal to tradition, through reference to the interests of the
child involved in the case. Neither opinion, however, entertained concretely
the interests of the actual child.
D. The Cases Compared
The responses of the New
resembled responses of courts
questions about custody. This is
Baby M presents only minimal

Jersey courts in Baby M most closely
handling more routine cases involving
not accidental. Unlike Johnson and Davis,
disruption to cultural expectations about

276. See supra notes 215-23 and accompanying text (discussing failure of the New Jersey
Supreme Court to consider real correlates of Baby M's situation in making conclusions about her
best interests).
277. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799 (quoting Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1986)

(Mosk, J., concurring)).
278. One justice concurred, agreeing that Crispina Calvert should be named the "natural
mother of the child she at all times intended to parent and raise as her own" but disagreeing with the
majority's further suggestion that surrogacy contracts were not inconsistent with state public policy.
Id. at 787-88 (Arabian, J., concurring).
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human reproduction. Artificial insemination has been known for centuries,
and has been used in human reproduction for two centuries.2 79 The
procedure, in requiring the extra-corporal transfer of sperm, disrupts the
continuity of the reproductive process, but does not seriously challenge
cultural assumptions about the meanings of maternity, paternity, or the
parent-child bond. As a result, Baby M could be, and to a large extent was,
framed by the courts to resemble other far less exceptional disputes about
children between antagonistic adults.
Baby M did, however, threaten social expectations about the forms
through which families should be established. Most of the contradictions and
confusions in the Baby M opinions result from the courts' (and larger
society's) reluctance to design the parent-child bond in contractual terms.
Both of the courts that heard the case were able to rely on the best interests
of the child to resolve the dispute in a manner that seems, at least at first, to
differ only minimally from many other best-interest analyses. In fact, of
course, that analysis, precisely because it was largely effected as if the case
were no different than a thousand other custody cases, failed ultimately to
take account of the child's best interests within the social context that led to
the creation of, and would continue to define, the child's life. In the end, the
state supreme court determined the best interests of a fictive child, and not of
the actual child involved in the case.
Both Davis and Johnson, in contrast with Baby M, challenge the
conceptions on the basis of which society has comprehended kin relations.
In each of these cases, courts invoked children (or embryos), and justified
the decisions reached with assurances that the children, or potential children,
would be well served. However, neither case allowed for simple application
of the best-interest test. So in Davis, the state supreme court determined that
embryos, although not people, are owed a "special respect" as potential
people, and thereby established the moral frame within which the dispute
should be resolved. Then, apparently without recognizing the gap between
that frame and the actual resolution, the court examined and selected among
the interests of the adults whose donated gametes had produced the embryos
in question.
Similarly, the state supreme court in Johnson bypassed familiar legal
responses. In Johnson, the state supreme court fashioned a response which,
in asking courts to rely on parental intent to establish parentage, sided fully
with the world of contract and autonomous individuality. The court then
described that same response as benefitting inevitably the children whose fate
it would determine.
279. See SHALEV, supra note 196, at 58-60.
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In all of these cases, courts invoked children and their interests in order
to justify an astonishing variety of ends not directly related to those children.
Children were invoked, for instance, (by the trial court in Baby M) to
mitigate the court's obvious discomfort at having validated the
contractualization of the parent-child bond; (by the trial court in Davis) to
proclaim the potential humanity and consequent respect owed to gametic and
embryonic material, frozen or fresh; (by the state supreme court in Davis) to
erect a moral vision in terms of which courts should entertain the fate of
frozen embryos, but which bore little relevance to the court's actual
conclusions; (by the state supreme court in Johnson) to mediate the
contradictions between a world founded in terms of contract (intent, as
generally understood) and a world founded in terms of status ("intent" as the
court reinterpreted the notion).
The courts justified each position and each end through association with
images of childhood.
But in these cases, and increasingly as the
consequences of assisted reproduction more fully challenge expectations
about the sources and limits of family, such association with images of
children remains just that, an association unsupported by even the attempt to
determine and affect the interests of children.
CONCLUSION
In the years following the Industrial Revolution, society elaborated
images of children and childhood that had begun to develop with the wane of
the feudal order. These images served a deep nostalgia for a world of
tradition assumed to have preceded the upheavals brought with the nineteenth
century marketplace. In identifying children as the enduring center of family
life, society erected a framework within which to connect the present to a
valued past. That framework provided an apparent bulwark in society's
attempts to constrain and regulate the transformation of the family that began
in the mid-nineteenth century. Those attempts were expressly
institutionalized by the law in the form of the best-interest standard. In that
form, society's apparent concern for children served children rather poorly.
However, the best-interest standard allowed a legal system, compelled to
respond to continuous change in the form and understanding of family, to
effect the double illusions of consistency and decency. In fact, the flexibility
of the best-interest standard provided a means for the law to respond to, and
variously to accept or to reject, almost any fad that, at one time or another,
seemed to define society's emerging understanding of the family and of the
parent-child bond. Moreover, the illusion of decency, provided by the
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standard's apparently consistent focus on children, was belied with almost
equal consistency by the consequences of the standard's application to actual
children. The standard allowed courts to further a variety of adult interests
and agendas under the guise of protecting children.
More recently, the law has been less adept at relying on children's
interests and on images of children to resolve and justify the resolution of
disputes about the family. Courts continue to invoke children and even, as
in Baby M, to apply the best-interest standard, but the turmoil engendered
for understandings of family by the confluence of contemporary social and
technological transformations renders the results obviously inadequate.
Courts plead for legislative guidance, but that guidance comes slowly and is
quickly rendered obsolete by rapid technological change.
And, more
important, legislators, like judges, must comprehend the implications for
social life of such changes in the meaning and form of family before they can
wisely regulate the changing family.
So, a debate about the family, initiated over a century ago, intensifies.
Old truths are invoked, discarded, and re-imagined.
Possibilities for
multiply. 280
contract
of
terms
in
and
status
of
terms
in
designing families
For a long time, certain truths about children-about their centrality and
enduring value-stood apparently unaffected, at the eye of the debate, and
thereby provided a harbor within which the larger debate could be anchored.
Only now, with the added pressure of the challenges reproductive technology
presents to old understandings of family is this central, powerful symbol of
family-of traditional and modern families, alike-also being openly
subjected to re-examination and reconstruction.
Messages redefining the family are still communicated, if less securely
and less coherently, through references to children in cases involving
reproductive technology as the stakes at issue in the debate about the fate and
form of the family in American society escalate. In the process, the interests
of children are encompassed and subsumed by the ideological debate.
Nostalgic images of families of yore, symbolized most forcefully by
children-in-families, have served polemic interests for those who favor the
preservation of a hallowed past, and almost equally for those who endorse
individualizing and contractualizing the formation and operation of family
life but who temper the harshest implications of that choice with assurances
about the continuing appreciation of children and childhood. As the debate
unfolds, society continues to sacrifice the interests of children. Even more,
evidence accumulates that suggests a new and far more radical shift away
280. See Strathern, supra note 116 (analyzing ideological contours of debate about status and

contract).
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from children and their interests in comprehending and regulating the family.
If so, we are witnessing a fundamental alteration in the status of childhoodeven perhaps the "disappearance of childhood." 2 8 '

281.

See POSTMAN, supra note 47 (suggesting that childhood as a notion may be eroding).

